VISITORS to the Oval Office last week remarked that they had rarely seen President George W Bush more energised than he has been in considering what to do next in Iraq.
General Peter Schoomacher, the US army chief, told friends he was impressed by the president’s seriousness of purpose. “He was very different in private to the man you see on television,” he said.
Stephen Biddle, a military expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, came away with the same impression: “Bush is often accused of being incurious and disengaged but he was very curious and engaged. He was probing and asking a lot of questions.”
Biddle was one of a handful of advisers drafted in to the White House to counsel Bush on a change of course in Iraq. The president has been holding meetings with generals, intelligence staff, analysts and diplomats to assess whether an Iraq that can “govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself” — the goal he set himself — is remotely achievable.
Having ruled out a “graceful exit”, Bush is tempted by the one option that presents the slightest chance of success: a sustained surge of up to 40,000 US forces into Baghdad and the Sunni stronghold of Anbar province.
He believes a sharp boost in troop numbers could salvage his reputation as a resolute war leader while presenting a satisfying break with the “cut and walk” proposal to reduce combat troops by early 2008 that came from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by James Baker, his father’s secretary of state. This independent report is already gathering dust.
Behind the scenes, however, a row has broken out with generals over whether the option that could save the president’s face is militarily achievable. Previous pushes, such as last summer’s “battle for Baghdad”, have resulted in more casualties and a flare-up in sectarian fighting.
America’s most senior generals have told Bush bluntly that a surge could work, but only under strict conditions. They are not interested in a short-lived policy of “one more heave” that will waste the lives of more US soldiers, do nothing to halt a civil war and ultimately leave the military scrambling for an undignified way out of Iraq.
Schoomacher doubts that increasing troop numbers will make much difference unless there is also a shake-up in Iraq’s politics. “We should not surge without a purpose and that purpose should be measurable and get us something,” he said.
According to defence sources, he has been even more forthright in private. In essence, the generals have told Bush that they are willing to pour in more troops only if the Baghdad government allows US forces to crack down on Shi’ite militias, particularly those loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, the cleric.
In return, the US military would commit extra troops to hunting down Sunni insurgents and provide security for the terrorised Shi’ite community.
Jack Keane, a retired general and former army deputy chief of staff who also saw Bush last week, believes that the US military is capable of restoring order in Baghdad, given enough troops. “The notion that we can’t provide protection for people in one of the capital cities of this world is just rubbish,” he said. ()
Up to 20,000 new troops could be sent to Iraq, while 20,000 who were set to return to America could remain. The plan would incorporate elements of the “80% solution” favoured by Dick Cheney, the vice-president — so-called because of the combined Shi’ite and Kurdish population of Iraq — which involves a tilt towards the Shi’ites at the expense of the minority Sunni community.
The protection for Shi’ites will not be offered, however, if the government of Nouri al-Maliki continues to turn a blind eye to Sadr’s death squads. It must also be combined, the generals say, with a power-sharing deal to draw in the Sunni community as well as US economic investment.
“Nobody thinks success is likely now,” said Biddle. “It’s a question of how grave the consequences of a withdrawal will be. If you think they are grave, as I do, then the idea of ‘double down’ or quit (a blackjack term) offers the only chance of success. It is not great but it is not zero.”
It is also the policy favoured by Senator John McCain, the favourite for the 2008 Republican nomination, which could help to give Bush some much-needed political cover for a policy that is likely to be unpopular.
The wrangling has contributed to a delay in the president’s speech on a new course in Iraq, which has been postponed until the new year. It is hoped that by then Maliki’s government will have begun to turn against Sadr and embarked on a process of political reconciliation.
According to sources, the president’s announcement of a new strategy would ideally take place against the backdrop of increasingly favourable conditions, such as the announcement of a new oil-sharing deal that is believed to be imminent.
Robert Gates, who will be sworn in as defence secretary tomorrow, will also have had a chance to put his stamp on the strategy. Leon Panetta, who served on the Iraq Study Group alongside Gates, believes the former CIA chief was sympathetic to the idea of a surge in US forces but got cold feet when the battle for Baghdad backfired.
The US military is already overstretched but Schoomacher is pressing to expand the army by 7,000 or more troops a year and intends to dip further into the National Guard and Army Reserve.
If Bush presses ahead with a surge in Iraq, it will mark a radical departure from the “light footprint” strategy favoured by General John Abizaid, the US commander in the Middle East, who believes the Iraqis should do more of their own fighting.
None of the options is attractive and all carry huge risks. Bush once said: “I am the decider.” If he misjudges the situation and the “double down” option fails, the clamour to leave Iraq may become unstoppable.
