Israel’s security Cabinet decided yesterday against an expansion of military activities in Lebanon and opted instead to mobilise additional reserve divisions. That was a wise conclusion. The only meaningful manner in which the conflict could have been heightened would have been to pour more ground troops into southern Lebanon, despite the reality that it might take years to withdraw them. Israel’s occupation of this area between 1982 and 2000 was an uncomfortable period for all sides. Ehud Olmert, Israel’s Prime Minister, is right to avoid a repetition.

Mr Olmert, a media-savvy politician at home, will also be aware that Israel is fighting a war on two fronts. There is the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon itself and the wider battle for international sentiment. The results in these two fields have been very different. While Israel can point to some, though mixed, military progress, it has been portrayed abroad, often unfairly, as an indiscriminate aggressor. This is an impression shaped by undoubtedly disturbing television pictures of the suffering of civilian casualties in Lebanese cities such as Beirut and Tyre.

Mr Olmert is engaged in a struggle with fanatical terrorists, not a public relations enterprise. He has powerful domestic political backing for what he is seeking to do (95 per cent of Israelis according to one poll published yesterday considered his actions to be justified). If there were hard proof that the assault on urban Lebanon was yielding benefits, the Israeli Prime Minister would have little interest in how he looked to outsiders, and such an attitude might well be legitimate.

There is, however, scant compelling evidence that the airstrikes in places such as southern Beirut are seriously inconveniencing Hezbollah. The buildings that are being struck may have been important administrative centres once, but they have been abandoned since the current hostilities broke out on July 12.

No intelligent Hezbollah operative would work from such sites in prevailing circumstances. There is also the inevitable dilemma that innocent people will be killed, events that Hezbollah have exploited ruthlessly for propaganda purposes. Such an outcome is, in short, of minimal military merit while damaging to political perceptions.

Mr Olmert would be astute to recognise this and change tack accordingly. He is not in a position where he can simply end the effort to restrict Hezbollah — that would not secure the release of the two abducted soldiers whose capture triggered this crisis, nor deter zealots from firing more rockets (and there have been 1,500 sent in the past fortnight) into Israeli territory. Yet the prospect of an enduring contest in Lebanon has no appeal to him or to senior commanders in the army.

Israel should focus, therefore, on the places nearer its border from where missiles have been fired, or where they would probably be used for offensive purposes. It should make it plain that this is its strategy and that those who want to leave southern Lebanon can move to cities without fear of being caught in bombing there.

This approach would not impress the habitual Israel-haters overseas, of which there is a sizeable and vocal number. More untarnished observers would, though, regard it as reasonable. It is, after all, hardly in Mr Olmert’s interests to inflict little practical harm on his foes while making it harder for friends elsewhere to stand with him.