The turmoil and violence now engulfing Gaza has already cost the job of Ahmed Qureia, the Palestinian Prime Minister, who yesterday reaffirmed his decision to resign because of the “chaos and lawlessness” in the densely populated strip. More is at stake than just his job. The weekend rioting and the storming of the Palestinian military intelligence headquarters are the most serious challenge to Yassir Arafat since Palestinians gained a measure of self-rule from Israel ten years ago. Together with the clashes between rival security forces, the internecine struggle between the militants, the manoeuvrings of faction chiefs and the widespread anger at the paralysis and misrule, the violence could quickly lead to civil war. Gaza’s future has rarely looked so desperate.

Triggering the uprising was Mr Arafat’s clumsy attempt to assert his failing authority by dismissing the Gaza security chief and appointing a widely disliked cousin in his place. Such blatant cronyism not only infuriated Mr Qureia, who has been fighting a losing battle to get Mr Arafat to crack down on terrorism and corruption; it was also the signal for militants to press their demands for wholesale changes to the Palestinian Authority, which they also accuse of corruption. On this point, the pragmatists opposing suicide bombings and the futile campaign of violence against Israelis agree. By his own incompetence, Mr Arafat has not only lost a leader of domestic and international credibility but united against himself almost every Palestinian faction, including the militant Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, an offshoot of his own Fatah movement.

Behind this uprising lie two bigger issues, however: a power struggle for control of Gaza when the Israelis pull out next year, and the succession to the Palestinian leadership as the ageing Mr Arafat’s physical condition and political position become ever weaker. Hamas, despite the Israeli rocket attacks and targeted assassinations that have sharply reduced its ability to sponsor violence and suicide bombings, has tightened its hold in Gaza — largely because of its uncompromising Islamist ideology and its network of support for the poor, which contrasts with the misrule of the Arafat cronies. Hamas is now fighting to reinforce the claim that it will force Israel to withdraw troops and settlers from Gaza. The despairing and dwindling group of moderates find themselves in a no-win alliance with the Palestinian Authority. Both are nominally committed to an end to the violence in order to restart peace talks, persuade Israel to allow in more Palestinian workers and convince a sceptical outside world to use its leverage to deliver a better deal.

But Mr Qureia, like Mahmoud Abbas before him, finds himself in an impossible position. He needs to have de facto control on the ground before he can engage the US or act as a credible negotiating partner for the Israelis. Yet he is prevented at every turn by Mr Arafat from challenging the militants or even enforcing the law. With a stagnant economy and intense frustration at the security restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza, he can neither deliver the longed-for development and security nor bypass Mr Arafat — whose policy of divide and rule has not only neutralised Palestinian rivals but stymied any political and economic progress.

Mr Arafat’s cynicism has now run its course, however, and stoked the present conflict. Civil war in Gaza is in the interests of no one — and certainly not of Israel, whatever the short-term calculation that this would reduce international pressure and the flow of suicide bombers. Mr Qureia should remain at his post and try to pull his fellow Palestinians back from the brink.