This painted the Iraqi leader as a defensive, rather than an offensive threat, which was not the intelligence picture the Government was portraying in the rest of the dossier.

The disclosure that the sentence referring to Saddam’s possible response to an invasion was removed at the last moment was revealed during cross-examination of John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

The change of mind about a sentence of 17 words in what was supposed to be the final draft of the dossier, published on September 24 last year, followed an e-mail from Jonathan Powell, the Prime Minister’s chief of staff.

Dated September 19 and timed at 15.45pm, three-quarters of an hour after the deadline set by Mr Scarlett for any last-minute comments, Mr Powell wrote: “I think the statement on p19 that ‘Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat’ is a bit of a problem.” Mr Powell said that this backed up the “Don McIntyre (sic: Donald Macintyre political columnist for the Independent) argument that there is no CBW (chemical biological weapons) threat and we will only create one if we attack him”. The e-mail concluded: “I think you should redraft the para. My memory of the intelligence is that he has set up plans to use CBW on Western forces and that these weapons are integrated into his military planning.”

Cross-examined by Andrew Caldecott, QC, for the BBC, Mr Scarlett said that he decided to remove the sentence, but he denied that it was solely in response to Mr Powell’s e-mail. He and the assessment staff in the Cabinet Office looked again at the intelligence and realised that there was no JIC assessment which made it clear whether they were defining Saddam’s chemical weapons threat as defensive or offensive.

There was also recent reporting which was not reflected in the final draft which placed Saddam’s “attachment” to chemical weapons in the context of his perception of his regional position. So he decided to remove the sentence before sending the final draft of the dossier to the printers.

Mr Caldecott said that it looked as if the dossier was changed at the last moment to remove an express suggestion that Saddam was a defensive threat and to leave the implication that he was an offensive threat. Mr Scarlett disagreed.

Asked if he accepted that a document could be transformed by omission, Mr Scarlett replied: “Of course it’s important what you take out as well as what you put in.”

Mr Caldecott expressed astonishment that the change was made despite the fact that the 17 words “had appeared in the September 11 draft approved by the JIC, had appeared in the September 16 draft approved by the JIC and had appeared in the September 19 draft and approved by the JIC”.

The toughest questioning came over the issue of the 45-minutes intelligence. Mr Caldecott asked Mr Scarlett whether he had made clear to the Prime Minister that this deployment timetable for Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons referred to battlefield munitions, not strategic (long-range) missiles. Mr Scarlett replied: “There was no discussion with the Prime Minister that I can recall that the 45-minute point was in connection with battlefield or strategic systems.” He acknowledged that the intelligence about Iraq’s ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction did not specify which systems. But the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) had assessed that it was most likely a reference to multiple rocket launchers with a range of 20 kilometres, or artillery with a range of 40 kilometres.

Mr Caldecott remonstrated with Mr Scarlett that there was a clear difference between “casualties and range”; and newspapers on September 25, after publication of the Government dossier, had run headlines which referred to Iraq having the capability to hit British bases in Cyprus. Mr Scarlett said that the misinterpretation had only been a “fleeting moment”. It was not his job, he said, to correct inaccurate headlines.

Mr Scarlett was questioned in minute detail about the linguistic changes to the dossier in the different drafts, some of which had been suggested by Alastair Campbell, the outgoing Downing Street Director of Communications.

He insisted that he had editorial control over the dossier, and denied there had ever been any “tensions” between his staff and Downing Street. No one had minded Mr Campbell’s suggestions, he said.

One of the 16 points raised by Mr Campbell was over the 45-minutes intelligence.

Mr Scarlett said that the executive summary in the September 16 draft included the judgment that chemical and biological weapons “could be ready for use within 45 minutes of an order to do so”. But the main text said that they “may” have that capability.

“This was clearly an inconsistency which was unbalanced and needed to be addressed,” Mr Scarlett said. The DIS, he disclosed, had already raised this question, and the language was “tightened”, removing the inconsistency.

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