As the horse-trading at the United Nations reaches its climax, it is worth recalling Palmerston’s maxim about international relations: in diplomacy, there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. A good illustration of this principle is America’s relationship with President Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, both of whom were once identified by the US as allies, or at least potential partners — in the struggles against communism in Afghanistan and Shia fundamentalism in Iran.
Palmerston’s cynical dictum is often quoted by people who lament the absence of idealism in world affairs. But if there is one lesson from the global catastrophe evolving out of the Iraq crisis, it is that rational calculations of material interest are a far more benign principle for political action than an idealism which is all too often dogmatic, and can sometimes blend into the single-minded fundamentalism of which pacifists and “internationalists”, such as Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, are as guilty as warmongers and unilateralists, such as Ariel Sharon or George W. Bush.
When we praise the idealistic principles of a Clare Short or a Joschka Fischer it is worth remembering that idealism and unquestioning belief in their own moral superiority are also the driving forces behind bin Laden — as they were behind Lenin and even Hitler.
In trying to understand what is going on in the Iraq crisis it is helpful to divide the world between countries and governments that still seem to be following some version of Palmerston’s dictum rationally and those that are veering towards some fundamentalist nirvana.
In the first group are the African countries on the UN Security Council which are likely, in the end, to vote for a US-British resolution. Only by voting with America, albeit after extracting large concessions and bribes, can the “non-aligned” countries hope to preserve the power and influence they have suddenly won in a post-Cold War UN, whose primary function is simultaneously to restrain and legitimise the global hegemony of the US.
This is surely the UN’s optimal role in the next few decades. UN involvement in the Iraq crisis is not about preserving the “international order” created after the Second World War or defending the rule of international law. The UN played no real part in preserving the post-war order because Soviet vetoes prevented the Security Council from exercising its theoretical responsibilities as a global supreme court. While there were no wars in Europe, their absence had nothing to do with the UN system. Instead it was based on nuclear deterrence and the balance of power between Nato and the Warsaw Pact.
Another rational country appears to be Russia. It is unlikely to veto the US-UK resolution but wants to encourage France and Germany to defy the US. American recognition of Russia’s unique military importance would not only help to satisfy national pride and offer the restless army a vision of a potential global role, a partnership with America would also guarantee Russia a free hand in crushing the Chechens and maintaining its influence in Central Asia, as well as accelerating its integration in the global economy. Meanwhile, a Russian dream is coming true with the rapid dissolution of Nato, as American public opinion identifies France and Germany as persistent troublemakers and even enemies, instead of allies. Thus it is very much in Russia’s interest to encourage France to use its veto against the US. This seems the most plausible explanation for Russia’s hard line in the past few days.
The other rational player in this crisis is, surprisingly, Tony Blair. Mr Blair quickly understood that September 11 could offer an opportunity to lock a dangerously fundamentalist US government into the UN system and to create a semblance of an international order (note to Clare Short — not “preserve” a UN order which never existed, but create one for the first time).
Such an “order” could not be based on trying to “hobble” the US giant. This would be not just futile but terrifyingly anarchic, since the US is the only “global policeman” with the power and the courage to impose order in places such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, where the UN’s writ never ran. Mr Blair could see that the UN’s mission should not be to “control” America, still less to defy it, but to channel and legitimise America’s essentially benign monopoly of military power. Mr Blair shared this rational vision with leaders from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Poland and most other countries in Eastern Europe — and I believe it was absolutely right.
Mr Blair also believed that Britain’s interest was to act as a bridge between America and Europe. Mr Blair’s success last September in persuading President Bush to seek UN backing for his Iraq adventure was a triumph for the Prime Minister personally, as well as for Britain’s interests in global prosperity and peace.
That, at least, was how things looked until two months ago, when a peaceful resolution of the Iraq crisis, either through Saddam’s exile or abject surrender, seemed likely. But in January, the best-laid plans of such rational actors as Britain, Russia, Italy and Cameroon, started to fall apart. They fell apart for a very simple reason: four of the key players in the global chess game acted out of conviction instead of national interest. These four rogue nations were Iraq, Germany, France and the US.
Iraq’s fatal error was comprehensible. Saddam should have moved faster to satisfy the UN inspectors, who offered his only hope of staying in power. But at least he was rational in believing that, within a strategy of reluctant acquiescence, his best tactic was to play for time.
Germany’s blunder was also understandable. Germany will suffer grievous damage from the withdrawal of US troops and economic support. But after the 20th century, a militantly pacifist Germany is something the world can welcome. Nobody should complain about its decision to accept global irrelevance in the same way as Japan.
That leaves France and the US. It is their sentimental irrationalism that lies at the root of the present crisis and threatens the future of all international institutions.
France’s failure to pursue its interests is particularly surprising, given the French bureaucracy’s reputation for supreme competence. France will lose the global influence it briefly enjoyed from its veto power if the Security Council is discredited or its legitimacy is linked to majority voting. Its alliance with Germany will isolate it in a Europe of 25 nations. Its defence, aerospace and electronics industries will be doomed to technological obsolescence if they are boycotted by US customers and joint-venture partners.
And to what purpose? To tweak America’s nose? To honour a friendship between Chirac and Saddam that goes back to the early 1970s? To placate Muslim voters, whose real gripes are not about foreign policy but about the racial prejudice they suffer in France? If France uses its veto, this will go down in history as a classic Chirac own goal, even worse than the whimsical misjudgment in 1997, when he imperiously dissolved the French parliament for no good reason (following the advice of Dominique de Villepin), thereby wrecking his first presidential term.
Which brings me, finally, to the most irrational player of all — George W. Bush. The Axis of Evil policy has wrecked the US economy, doubled oil prices, undermined the dollar and decimated the value of American assets at home and abroad. The obsession with Iraq has diverted energy from the War against Terror, has fuelled anti-US feeling and intensified global hatred of Israel, which is seen as the real inspiration of US policy against Iraq. Worst of all, Mr Bush’s pointless belligerence is not even delivering the political dividends that the White House expected after September 11.
If only Mr Bush had rationally calculated America’s self-interest, which mandates lower oil prices, a focus on domestic economic problems and a foreign policy directed against religious fundamentalists (whether sponsored by theocratic despots, as in Saudi Arabia, or democratically supported, as in Pakistan), not against secular dictators such as Saddam. But George Bush fancies himself as an idealist, just like Fischer, Chirac and Short.
If only America could be led by a calculating pragmatist, the world would be a much safer and more prosperous place. Palmerston is not available. What about Bill Clinton?
