Defence secretaries in wartime get their fair share of criticism. And when you are as prominent and as outspoken as Donald Rumsfeld, you certainly know how to take it. But even he must have been reeling a little last week.
This was, after all, supposed to be a golden moment for the Bush administration’s most public wartime face. Rumsfeld is one of relatively few cabinet members held onto by the president. His colleagues in devising the war in Iraq — George Tenet, the former CIA director, Paul “Jerry” Bremer, the former head of the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority, and General Tommy Franks — were rewarded last week with presidential Medals of Freedom, the highest civilian honour in America. The post-election offensive in Falluja went about as well as could be expected. Elections in Iraq are on schedule for late January.
But hubris has a long and deep relationship with the Bush administration — “Mission accomplished”, anyone? Rummy knows this better than most. When he was in Kuwait last week and was confronted by a peeved military grunt asking when he and his fellows would get the armour they need to protect them from roadside bombs, Rummy turned dismissive.
“You go to war with the army you have,” he harrumphed. In the fuller context he was more engaged. But his initial response to criticism was classic Rumsfeld: blame someone else.
It was the final harrumph for some. Senator John McCain told the press that he had “no confidence” in the defence secretary. Chuck Hagel, another powerful Republican senator who is also on the armed services committee, put the boot in: “That soldier, and those men and women there, deserved a far better answer from their secretary of defence than a flippant comment.”
General Norman Schwarzkopf, architect of the first Iraq war, was steaming: “I was very, very disappointed. No, let me put it stronger. I was angry by the words of the secretary of defence when he laid it all on the army, as if he . . . didn’t have anything to do with the army and the army was over there . . . screwing up.”
Then, on cue, Bill Kristol, another Rumsfeld critic and perhaps the leading neoconservative in Washington, wrote a piece in The Washington Post that had smoke rising from the newsprint. Since I could not put it better, let me quote Kristol:
“Perhaps Rumsfeld simply had a bad day. But then, what about his statement earlier last week when asked about troop levels? ‘The big debate about the number of troops is one of those things that’s really out of my control.’ Really? Well, ‘the number of troops we had for the invasion was the number of troops that General Franks and General (John) Abizaid wanted’. Leave aside the fact that the issue is not ‘the number of troops we had for the invasion’ but rather the number of troops we have had for post-war stabilisation. Leave aside the fact that General Tommy Franks had projected that he would need a quarter-million troops on the ground for that task — and that his civilian superiors had mistakenly promised him that tens of thousands of international troops would be available . . .
“In any case, decisions on troop levels in the American system of government are not made by any general or set of generals but by the civilian leadership of the war effort. Rumsfeld acknowledged this last week — after a fashion: ‘Everyone likes to assign responsibility to the top person and I guess that’s fine’. Except he fails to take responsibility.”
Ouch. But so true. I have long been a fan (and friendly acquaintance) of Rumsfeld. Any defence secretary who does not provoke friction with the military is not doing his job. Rumsfeld has faced enormous challenges these past four years. But when fresh from electoral victory a key administration official is all but lambasted from his own ideological ranks, something is awry.
The case against him is a relatively simple one. Rumsfeld came into the Pentagon with an admirable agenda of forcing the military to become leaner, to maximise the use of technology and to move away from the large numbers and heavy armaments of the past. But his wars showed that the old methods were still valid.
Yes, Rumsfeld proved that a small force with lightning speed and technological skill could topple a dictatorship in Iraq with unprecedented economy of manpower. But it became abundantly clear almost immediately thereafter that the force needed to keep the peace, to police a country of tens of millions, to seal borders, to gain intelligence and to suppress rioting, looting and disorder would have to be far larger. Bremer conceded this.
In retrospect it seems blindingly obvious. At the time it seemed blindingly obvious. But for the post-invasion strategy to work, Rumsfeld would have had to admit that he was wrong and needed to adjust. Getting Rumsfeld to admit that he is wrong is a little like expecting George Bush to become pregnant. So they hung on. Until their stubbornness led to chaos, insurgency and the unravelling of the liberating dream.
Worse than stubbornness has been Rummy’s refusal to take responsibility. When looting broke out, he said: “Stuff happens.” No it doesn’t. When you don’t have a plan to contain post-liberation chaos, looting breaks out.
Rumsfeld did not go to war with the army he had. He went to war with the army and the allies that he and his commander-in-chief chose. He had months to plan for the war and could have postponed it. He is responsible for the errors of foresight and the lack of equipment that have left soldiers vulnerable to injury.
One reason why last week saw a veritable outburst of anger is that he has never taken responsibility for any of this. And still he refuses to ask for more troops over all. He wants the war on the cheap.
Some actually want to win. What we saw last week was the final, long-pent-up frustration of those who have always been for liberating Afghanistan and Iraq, but who see a clear mismatch between America’s goals and its means. They are not lefties or softies. They largely kept their peace before the election, believing that John Kerry would be an even worse option. But they recognise in Rumsfeld an obstacle to victory rather than an asset.
Will Bush hear them? This would mean admitting that he has made mistakes himself. So far he has shown scant ability to do this. There is a reason, after all, why he and Rumsfeld get along. When you think you are perfect, all critics are enemies. Until, of course, they are proven horribly right.
