Two days ago, I left the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan because, as I stated in my resignation letter, “I have believed for some time that the mission and indeed the engagement of the international community in Afghanistan were failing to tackle the fundamental political issues underlying the insurgency”. I had worked for UNAMA since June 2007, first in the southeast of the country, and then, from the start of this year, at the headquarters in Kabul, joining Peter Galbraith’s political team on election day.

From the beginning of my time in Afghanistan, I got the sense that we were drifting. That, although we had many programmes and initiatives, we did not really have a strategy worthy of the name. In fact, we were not even having the types of discussions that might lead to a strategy. Although I have tried to remain optimistic, I now believe that strategic failure is the most likely outcome of our engagement in Afghanistan.

Among the greatest mistakes of the international community has been its laissez-faire approach to the corruption, cronyism and venality of the Afghan Government. The insurgency is winning not so much because the Taleban’s ideology and platform have popular appeal, but because the Afghan Government is seen as corrupt, unrepresentative and ineffective. The counter-insurgency approach promoted by the ISAF Commander, General McChrystal, is entirely dependent on there being a government that Afghan people feel is worth fighting for, rather than against.

Ideally this would have been delivered through elections. But on election day, as I worked in the UN election co-ordination centre in contact with colleagues in offices across Afghanistan, it became obvious to us that the elections had failed. Turnout was just too low and fraud too high for the results ever to be credible. Instead of seeking an alternative political process, as a number of us proposed, we attempted to salvage the elections in a messy, drawn-out affair that satisfied almost no-one.

Despite the effective withdrawal of Abdullah Abdullah from the run-off election, it may still go ahead on Saturday. Turnout will be minimal and the indications are that it will be no less fraudulent than the first round. Constitutionally, it will secure a re-election for President Karzai, but with a very tenuous mandate. The lesson is clear. It is simply not possible to hold effective elections when the country is at war and where the electoral machinery is controlled by one of the candidates.

Afghanistan requires fundamental political reform — a stronger parliament so that power can be shared between Afghanistan’s myriad ethnicities, who can hold the executive to account; and decentralisation to enable Afghans to participate in governance within their communities — something much more in keeping with Afghan traditions.

So whenever and however these dreadful elections end, we will require a political process to build legitimacy for a new government. This should be brought about through a series of “jirgas” — traditional meetings — with the participation of tribal leaders, civil society and women’s groups. It should involve Afghans currently outside the political class, including those opposing the Government. The process should culminate in a “Loya Jirga”, to approve amendments to the constitution, approve the make-up of a new government and reach a fresh agreement between Afghanistan and the international community.

The only way to make this happen is for the international community to force it upon a reluctant Afghan Government, using our aid monies as leverage. This may seem an affront to Afghanistan’s sovereignty — foreign meddling that Afghan politicians like to complain vociferously about. But we’re paying a very high price in blood and treasure to prop up this Government and, unless we are prepared to take a much firmer stance, we will fail. We have empowered an Afghan elite that is doing very well out of the present arrangements. We often talk earnestly about putting the Afghan Government in the lead, but senior Afghan politicians have little interest in reform. They must know that the whole edifice will come crashing down, but for the time being will continue to make as much money as they can.

A fresh approach would mean pushing the reset button on the Afghan nation-building project. It is not without risk, but the rewards of getting it right would be great. Most Afghans want security and justice — a brutal version of which the Taleban can provide — but they also want jobs and a better life, which the Taleban is not in a position to offer. And they are pragmatic. They will change their position if they perceive it to be in the interest of themselves and their families. Engaging Afghans in a dialogue about the future of their government has the potential to shift momentum and undercut support for the insurgency. Although radical, I believe that this offers the best and perhaps only chance of resolving this conflict.

Clausewitz famously declared “war is the continuation of politics by other means”. The problem is that we have the war but not the politics. A political strategy cannot come from the military. It has to come from the politicians, the diplomats and the UN. Our soldiers are taking great physical risks. It is time our political leaders took a few political risks.

Nick Horne served as political affairs officer at UNAMA in Afghanistan