Anatole Kaletsky: Economic view
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Last week’s effort by the world’s central banks to relieve the global credit crunch with a cash injection failed to impress the markets. But the move is bound to win round the sceptics within the next few months. The decision is likely to be just the precursor to much more important, but controversial, operations to ensure the “solvency” of the international financial system.
The distinction between the problems of liquidity and solvency, which looks like the next challenge for monetary authorities around the world, is illustrated by the British Government’s travails over Northern Rock. The Northern Rock crisis looked initially like a liquidity crisis.
Nobody questioned the underlying value of the Rock’s mortgages and therefore its ability to repay depositors in the long term. The problem was simply one of timing – if too many depositors wanted to withdraw their money, the bank could not sell off or “liquidate” its mortgages and other long-term assets quickly enough to pay the depositors back. It is now apparent, however, that Northern Rock also faces a solvency problem. The collapse of confidence in the British housing market has reduced the market value of its mortgages.
As a result, Northern Rock’s problem is no longer just a matter of liquidity and timing. Even if the Rock could liquidate all its mortgages tomorrow, it could not raise enough money to repay its depositors and the Bank of England in full, because the market prices of mortgage assets are today much lower than 100p in the pound. The upshot is that the Government will almost certainly have to nationalise Northern Rock after putting it into administration. The two options of nationalisation and administration are not, incidentally, polar opposites, as suggested in much of the media coverage, but one and the same. The Government could only seize control of the Rock and wipe out the claims of its shareholders by first putting the company into bankruptcy. The Treasury could then buy the bank from its administrator overnight for £1, pay off the depositors out of public funds and, in exchange, take control of all its mortgages and other assets. As these mortgages were paid off, the Treasury would gradually recover its outlay, with interest.
Alternatively, the Treasury could sell the whole mortgage book to another bank, if and when market prices for mortgages recovered. But whether taxpayers’ money was ultimately recouped would depend on whether Northern Rock’s borrowers continued to pay back their mortgages on schedule and on the expectations of the banks that might want to acquire Northern Rock’s mortgage book about how many borrowers might eventually default. The cost of the whole operation, in other words, will be determined by expectations about the housing market and the economy in the years ahead.
This issue of expectations is now at the root of the problem, not only for Northern Rock and the British Government, but for banks and financial authorities around the world. Because of worldwide fears about a housing meltdown, the market value of mortgage-related assets has been downgraded. These downgrades have created doubts about the underlying solvency of some banks and forced all of them to curtail their lending.
The hope since last summer has been that the process of establishing a new lower value for mortgage assets would take until the year-end, after which the banks that were severely hurt would raise extra capital from investors and return to normal operations next year. The role of central banks in this process would simply be to provide temporary liquidity to the markets until the repricing process was completed.
In the past few weeks, however, it has become obvious that this assumption was overoptimistic. Instead of a once-and-for-all repricing of mortgage assets, markets have kept pushing values ever lower, forcing banks to keep revising down their estimates of available capital and rein in their lending even more. As a result, the summer liquidity crisis has been turning into a loss of confidence in the long-term solvency of the global banking system banks. That collapse in confidence has, in turn, aggravated pessimism about next year’s economic prospects, intensifying doubts about bank solvency.
There is now only one way to stop this vicious circle. If banks could convince investors that their audited year-end results offer an honest picture of their potential losses and new capital needs, then most banks could easily raise this extra capital on global markets and normal financial conditions would quickly be restored. But what if the year-end results fail to convince investors, partly because observable market prices for mortgage assets simply do not exist? In that case, governments will almost certainly have to intervene directly to put a floor under mortgage values, thereby underwriting the solvency, as well as the liquidity, of banks.
Ways of doing this could range from governments directly buying mortgages from stricken lenders such as Northern Rock, to administrative guidance from public bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements on the models to be used for valuing mortgages which cannot be traded in the open markets at any reasonable price.
There are numerous reasons for expecting some sort of government intervention if the markets fail to arrive at a private-sector solution by the time the year-end results are published. If shareholders refuse to believe the banks’ audited financial statements or if their auditors find themselves unable to express true and fair options on the value of mortgage assets. First, regulators will be able to present this crisis as a genuine case of “market failure” with far-reaching “external effects” on the global economy – the standard economic conditions justifying government intervention with free markets. Second, the moral hazard of using government money to clear up a banking mess will be mitigated by the big additional losses bank shareholders will suffer if the markets continue to disbelieve their audited financial results.
Third, and most importantly, central bankers will soon face a choice between two unappealing alternatives: stabilise their financial systems with public money or cut interest rates much more steeply to keep the world economy afloat. Since central bankers around the world are justifiably reluctant to keep slashing interest rates at a time when global inflation remains uncomfortably high, they are likely to see bank bailouts as the lesser of two evils.
The upshot is that the year-end results season offers stock markets a last chance to make plausible estimates of mortgage losses and to recapitalise the banks. If the banks, their auditors and shareholders, cannot quickly do this, then government intervention will become inevitable to underwrite the solvency, as well as the liquidity, of the banks. And the biggest losers in such a process should not be taxpayers, but existing shareholders in the stricken banks.

Anatole Kaletsky writes for The Times Comment pages on Thursdays. One of the country's leading commentators on economics, he was formerly Economics Editor and is now an Associate Editor of The Times. He has won many awards for his financial and political journalism. Before joining The Times, he worked for 12 years on the Financial Times
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Please tell me where has the momey gone. If the property/asset has been inflated, some one must have a profit over the surplus. He/she might have deposited the gain in a bank though it might not be the one that lend the money to finance a property.
I want to ask is that whether the solvency problem just limited to individual bank. Only when banks do not trust each other then the issue of liquidity occur.
Can you explain please?
David HUI, New Territories, Hong Kong
It "failed to impress the markets" because it was not meant to impress the markets.
It was an offer of cash to banks in need of cash.
Bytheway - who are "the markets" you mentioned?
Peter Vernunft, Berlin, Germany
The problem is the new basel 2 rules for banks capital ratios. Every time you have a loss you need more capital. Because you don't know the extent of your losses you hoard capital? Thus we have the current problem; it is systemic. How to slove it? Postpone the new rules- revert to the old. Cutting interest rates will not work because the banks need to restore their capital ie make and keep profits? Introducing more ilquidity by the central banks doesn't help either as this cannot count as permanent bank capital. If the banks loose $200billion then their ability to lend shrinks by$2 trillion assuming a capital ratio of 10%. Then there is no mortgages, no credit cards and little commercial lending. Time to wake up. This is the beginning of a disaster
Alan Morgan, Merifons, France
On liquidity and Northern Rock, it is a shame they did not remember the bank scene from the film, Mary Poppins.
FRANCIS X. HEALY, JR., WARRINGTON, PA US
If administration followed by nationalisation is the way for one bank, does not that apply to all banks who become insolvent? That may mean the end of the global capitalist system, but I think that process would need to be carefully managed, for the skills needed to run a command economy may need to be re-invented.
John, Kenilworth,
Bring the gold system back. This is the only solution to this global uncertain market crisis. Not having a physical object to back your currency with, is the main reason behind this inter-bank lending crises and collapse of giants such as Northern Rock.
Tauseef Zahid, London, UK
J McAleese, Derby: You are missing the point. Many of NR's mortgagees will not repay because they can't. That is why nobody will buy these mortgages at face value.
Matthew, New York, USA
Kaletsky does not understand the word "solvency". He is wrong to say "It is now apparent, however, that Northern Rock also faces a solvency problem". A company is insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Northern Rock (with the taxpayers' money generously donated by Darling) is clearly solvent. The losers in this mess are the taxpayers and the shareholders, not the ordinary depositor creditors. Heard the one about the difference between a shopping trolley and Alistair Darling? The trolley has a mind of its own.
TG, Newark,
If NR's mortgage book is sold at a discount why should NR's mortgagees repay someone who is sitting on a guaranteed profit?
j McAleese, Derbys,
cww from Suffolk - protecting the broader economy from financial disaster is more important in the short term than worries about inflation especially when it's not particularly a major problem. It is not a Central Bank's sole purpose to control inflation.
Paul, London, UK
If NR are having trouble selling their mortgages, then why have they not started to encourage their existing borrowers to go elsewhere? This could be done by waiving Early Repayment Charges or even by a small financial incentive?
As things stand, they are still lending, which means that they are taking mortgages on their book that they can not sell at a profit. Surely this should stop now.
Minute, Maidenhead, UK
The problem is debt. There is too much of it about.
And what is the difference between the government printing more money, and the banks cutting interest rates, to shore up the debtors?
Clive, Colchester,
Unbelievable!
The losses on mortgage related financial assets will be huge. House prices have only just started falling. Northern Rock's 25b pound bail out (2 * UK's annual primary school budget) will seem small fry.
The million dollar question: where will the government get the money from for wholesale bale outs of the whole UK banking system. In practice there is now way taxes can be increased sufficiently, so that leaves one other possibility- print the money needed. Result: hyperinflation.
I don't like the sound of this option. I would much rather the banks that have lent badly to fail. I would also like bankruptcy laws to be abolished
Nigel Watson, Guildford, Surrey
'Nobody questioned the underlying value of the Rockâs mortgages and therefore its ability to repay depositors in the long term.' Well yes actually, Anatole, they did. Nearly everyone in the country knows that house prices are at least double what they should be. Building Societies and Banks maintain the fiction of mortgages being 'assets' because they have to. The alternative is to admit the possibility that a Northern Rock lurks behind the smart facade of every financial institution in the country. Which it almost certainly does - given the propensity of these institutions to admit to huge, VAST losses and then immediately claim that they are operating soundly and are on target. If I lend someone £100 on a car worth £50 then I deserve to lose £50 and no one should feel sorry for me. If I lend £100 of someone else's money on the car then no one with sense will lend me money again. At the basis of this crisis is just that. 'Credit crunch' = 'no one lends money to fools'. BOE excepted.
eric campbell, harrogate, uk
"...Instead of a once-and-for-all repricing of mortgage assets, markets have kept pushing values ever lower..."
In other words, the fundamental mistake was that at the start of the crisis, everyone expected the markets to behave rationally? There really is nothing new under the sun, is there?
Ian Kemmish, Biggleswade, UK
I think the inflation risk ahead is exaggerated by the current high prices of two important components, oil and food. In other circumstances the threat of more general inflation would indeed be real but the severe and continuing credit squeeze and high cost of debt will prevent companies passing on higher costs to consumers or paying higher wages. Paradoxically higher fuel, energy and food costs will have a deflationary impact on the rest of the economy via squeezed household budgets, that will cancel out any inflationary effects. Therefore even the normally cautious ECB should follow the Fed and BoE and deliver a cut in rates now.
Robert Cookson, Milton Keynes, UK
The central bankers have only themselves to blame for this unnecessary credit crisis. They panicked post 9/11 by lowering interest rates too far and then leaving them there for too long resulting in a colossal property and consumer boom. Even within the MPC's remit there was no real need to do so. Lessons to be learnt? No, they simply failed to learn from history.
cww, suffolk,
It has been clear for some time that the underlying asset value of NR is suspect. There have been stories of 125% mortgages as well as possible overhyping of property valuations. Add to this the effect on prices of distressed selling in a weak market and the real value of the mortgage book can be easily up to 50% discounted or more. (the quality of the borrowers will of course affect the rate of liquidation)
The taxpayer is at extreme risk of funding this black hole and can only be saved by a restoration of confidence and an orderly unwinding. This option may no longer be available (perhaps Lloydstsb offered this last hope) The administration and nationalisation route is a way of 'solving' the problem by hiding the ultimate losses into one more government department, quango or business taking the losses over many, many years.
I fear the government is now in the position of an avuncular investor who has foolishly bailed out a reckless nephew only to find himself ruined also.
peter boswell, chagford, UK
The central bankers have only themselves to blame for this unnecessary credit crisis. They panicked post 9/11 by lowering interest rates too far and then leaving them there for too long. This resulted in a colossal property and consumer boom which went unchecked. Even within the MPC's remit there was no real need to do so. Lessons to be learnt? No, they failed to learn from history.
cww, suffolk,
If the Government nationalises Northern Rock, mortgage holders will probably feel less inclined to keep up their payments. Some may feel their predicament is in part caused by the govenment so why should they repay.
And, If the govenment gets tough and starts repossessing people's homes, I can well imagine the flak they will get.
It seems to me the asset backing for taxpayers' money will suffer if the company is nationalised. The government should do more to faciitate a sale to the private sector even at some cost to the taxpayer.
Anthony, London,
Switzerland has long had a capital gains tax on owner-occupied property, while having none on financial assets. This means that speculative money tends to find its way into stocks and shares rather than the property market, with the result that the country has experienced neither excessive rises in property prices nor, currently, a property value crisis. UBS is another matter, of course!
Doug, Basel, Switzerland
As just released by Rightmove, House prices in London have fallen by an average of £28,000 in the past month. I fear Northen rock have a business that no-one will buy except for a paltry sum. Nationalisation is the only way forward now. The last crash took many years to bottom out. The goverment should take a long view and not sell until banks are profoitable again. Let not squander the taxpayers money.
However, who will save the next northen rock? There are clearly a few shaking balance sheets out there.
John, Reading, UK
Why this continued fear of 'marking to market' depreciating assets? House and mortgage valuations are falling because of real world, financial reasons, not because of some irrational vicious circle... Let it be! Let the deadbeats and their shareholders go bankrupt - any further state intervention can only make the inevitable fire-sale reckoning of distressed asset values even sharper. It will also fuel inflation, encourage yet more borrowing and insane risk-taking, destroy more people's savings and eventually reduce living standards for all...
Chris. Fulker, Jiji Township, Nantou County, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Why would the Finacial markets be impressed. The Western Nations areTrillions into Debt.One Bank, Norther Bank Requires more than $50Billions.
They have now done all they will do and say they tried their best.
Ther Banks have knowingly destroyed the western worlds economy by charging userouse interst. Ever Credit card and loan I have looked at have been ripping people off.
John, Middlesborough, UK
This is what happens when house prices rise higher than general inflation.It pretty obvious to me what the outcome is going to be,a stock market crash.Look where the Nikii was in 1990 and 1998 and where it is now.Didn't they keep cutting interest rates?
stephen hulton, eure, france
Why don't the Government nationalize and give the public the option of renting their homes at rates which will be lower than their mortgage and releive those unable to pay of the fear of repossession? This would create council housing through bank nationalization. Well it all seemed acceptable when it was privatization of council housing! In any case many of the properties will be former council housing anyway.
Heiko Khoo, London, UK