COULD Tony Blair still snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in Iraq? Could he rally the world behind his partnership with George W. Bush? Could he even achieve his ultimate ambition of going down in history as the first British leader who managed to weld together the nation’s European and transatlantic allian-ces and create a new global order, based on universal human values, enforced by the United Nations? The answer to all these questions could be “yes”, if only Mr Blair were prepared to do what he knows how to do best: act boldly and follow his own deeply held moral convictions.
For President Bush, Iraq is a total disaster. But for Mr Blair it could offer a once in a lifetime opportunity to enhance Britain’s international standing, increase his personal popularity and achieve his loftiest geopolitical ambitions — all at the same time. It is because Mr Bush has stumbled into America’s worst military and moral quagmire since Vietnam that Mr Blair now has a genuine chance to do some good — for Britain, for the Middle East and for the world.
To understand this we must look back to the promises which Mr Blair made when he committed Britain to the invasion of Iraq. While the legal justification was Saddam Hussein’s evasions on weapons of mass destruction, his motives for backing America were much broader. He wanted to reinforce the rule of law and strengthen the authority of the UN, which without the backing of US military power had never been more than a talking shop. Mr Blair wanted to keep America within the community of nations and, sotto voce, to protect the Bush Administration from its own isolationist disdain for world opinion. Above all, he wanted to create a better life for the Iraqi people, not only for its own sake, but also as a step towards a comprehensive Middle East peace and a reconciliation between the Arab world and the West.
A year later, it seems as if the Iraq adventure, far from advancing any of these objectives, has set them all back irretrievably. The Bush Administration may now want UN procedures to legitimise its occupation, but it has adamantly refused to cede any economic and military decision-making to the UN or even to abide by the Geneva Convention. As a result, America has become much more isolated than ever before. A global contest for “public enemy No 1” would probably be a photo- finish between Osama bin Laden and Mr Bush.
As for Iraq, the occupation has failed to provide security, to reconstruct the economy or even, as we know now, to restore a rudimentary respect for the rule of law. It is no longer obvious that the Iraqis are much better off than they were under Saddam. Of course the people of Iraq are freer and, of course, the Abu Ghraib abuses were bagatelles compared with what went on there before. But that is not the point. America has unleashed a state of anarchy on to a previously stable, if benighted, land — and now it is unable, or unwilling, to bring this bloody chaos under control. This, in the eyes of the Iraqi people, must surely be a terrible crime, much worse than the obscenities committed in the jails.
From Hitler to the Taleban, history suggests that war-weary nations crave public order far more than freedom or human rights. When faced with anarchy or dictatorial oppression, they will choose dictatorship every time. And now, as if to fan the Iraqi fears, America is looking for a rapid exit strategy, long before any semblance of order could possibly be restored. Even supporters of the war in Washington publicly acknowledge the signs of panic in the White House. As William Safire, the leading conservative columnist, recently put it: President Bush would never “cut and run” in Iraq, but he could be tempted to “cut and walk fast”.
This is the real long-term significance of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Now that US public support for Iraq war has started to drain away, it will continue to wane as inexorably as it did for Vietnam. And the tide of public opinion is an elemental force which no American politician can long defy. As a result, it is certain that America, if left to its own devices, will abandon Iraq long before “the job is done”. Which brings me back to Mr Blair.
The Prime Minister can ensure that America is not left to its own devices. But to advance Britain’s national interests, and his own personal objectives, he must offer his support in a new way. Thus far Mr Blair has backed every US policy unconditionally and without serious participation in Washington’s decision-making process: he has accepted unlimited responsibility without power. Now it is time to redress the balance. He can — and must — insist on a genuine partnership and some real power in Iraq. And he can do so because Mr Bush desperately needs his support.
With the November election approaching Mr Bush has to justify the occupation and persuade the voters that other countries’ forces will gradually take the place of US troops. If America’s staunchest ally were even to hint at a withdrawal, Bush’s promise of internationalising the occupation would collapse instantly, along with his re-election hopes. And a Bush defeat this year would consign the Republican Party to years of Tory-style oblivion and recriminations. Given this risk, even ideologues such as Dick Cheney would rather give Britain a genuine voice in the coalition than face the electoral nightmare of US isolation in Iraq.
But why is it so important for the Prime Minister to exploit this opportunity for a more equal partnership with Mr Bush? Partly because slavish obedience has rightly been resented in Britain; but more importantly because the lapdog role has been so tragically counter-productive. A genuine British say in the strategy of the coalition might have averted many of America’s worst mistakes, ranging from the neglect of postwar planning to the mass arrests of terrorist suspects, and the slavish support of Ariel Sharon.
Within Washington, British influence could have swung the balance of power away from the arrogant belligerence of Donald Rumsfeld and Mr Cheney, in favour of the more consensual approach of the State Department under Colin Powell. Mr Blair briefly managed this in September 2002, when he helped to persuade the President to appeal for UN support, but after that minor victory he was relegated again to a silent walk-on role. Now he has the chance to shift the balance in a permanent way.
It is time to demand some explicit assurances and policy changes from Washington in exchange for British support in Iraq. Privately, he must surely demand the removal of Mr Rumsfeld, a symbol of everything that has gone wrong in Iraq. Publicly, Mr Blair should require an explicit US commitment to abide by the Geneva Convention. More generally, Britain should seek the authority of the UN Security Council for its military and economic strategy in Iraq and insist that the US do the same. Finally, Mr Bush must be pressed to take tangible steps along the Middle East “road map” which he presented to Mr Blair as a quid pro quo for the invasion of Iraq. At a minimum, this means that America should acquiesce in UN condemnations of the type of state terror which Israel is perpetrating in Gaza, and withdrawal of US financial support if it continues its illegal acts.
A policy of conditional support for the US, instead of the present slavish obedience, could restore Mr Blair’s domestic popularity overnight and rehabilitate him as a serious player on the world stage. It could strengthen the UN, pull America back into the community of civilised nations and advance the Middle East peace process. Mr Blair must surely realise that US policies have been wrong — on postwar Iraq, on Israel, on the UN and on a host of related issues. All he needs is the courage to follow his own beliefs, not those of President Bush.
Join the debate at
comment@thetimes.co.uk
