There is a saying in Afghanistan: “You cannot buy an Afghan; you can only rent him.”

When the British first arrived in the country in 1839 they began distributing large bribes (which they called “subsidies”) to the more ferocious tribes. Three years later they discovered, in the bloodiest way possible, that while it is all very well to pay an Afghan not to kill you, when you stop paying, he is likely to start killing again.

From time immemorial the Ghilzai tribes controlled the passes through which trade routes came in and out of Afghanistan and took money from the travellers and merchants passing through. If they refused payment, they were likely to be pillaged and/or murdered.

When the British insisted that they stop this practice, the Ghilzais, not unreasonably by their own lights, demanded compensation. The annual stipend to the eastern Ghilzais was set at £8,000. All went well until 1841, when Sir William Macnaghten, the British envoy in Kabul, decided to cut costs.

The Ghilzais blocked the passes, and resumed their extortion. Sir William told his bosses in India that the natives were “kicking up a row about some deductions that have been made from their pay”, and promised that “the rascals will be well trounced for their pains”. Within a few months, Afghanistan exploded in rebellion. Sir William was murdered and his head paraded through the streets of Kabul.

Of the 16,000 people who set off from Kabul in the winter of 1841, only one survived the cold, starvation and the Ghilzai sharpshooters to complete the retreat to Jalalabad.

Josiah Harlan, an American mercenary and self-made Afghan potentate, blamed the British. “The English, who know well the value of gold, could have controlled the Afghans by fiscal diplomacy.”

Cash for peace may be a time-honoured way to tackle the problems of Afghanistan, but only so long as the rent is paid on time.

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