THE attack by Pakistani army helicopters on a religious school yesterday shows that President Musharraf is running out of options to control his lawless western border. There seems no coherent plan, as he switches from “peace deals” with tribesmen to attacks on them.

The US and Britain are increasingly alarmed at his struggles to get out of his predicament (a point bound to dominate the mooted trip by Tony Blair later this year, Pakistani analysts say). Although they now plan to put new pressure on him to sort out the border and the wild tribal regions, it is far from clear how he should do it or how they might help.

The attack on the madrassa has coincided with the first visit of the Prince of Waless to Pakistan. But suggestions that it was done to demonstrate to Britain that Pakistan could be tough on militants are surely nonsense. It has added hugely to the tension and security headaches of that trip, with weeping villagers accusing Musharraf’s forces of killing pupils as young as 7 and religious parties calling for his exit.

There were two likely triggers for the attack on the school in Bajaur, which the Pakistan Army says was run by a pro-Taleban commander, and was used for training 80 militants. The first was a 3,000-strong rally two days earlier, a few miles from the madrassa, in which militants chanted slogans in support of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taleban.

The second was the recent collapse of talks with local tribal leaders and clerics on the lines of a highly controversial pact which Musharraf struck in north Waziristan last month. This would have granted them freedom from Pakistan military action provided they worked to seal the border against Taleban and others intending to fight in Afghanistan.

At the heart of Musharraf’s predicament is the failure of the Waziristan pact. In the past six weeks, Taleban have reestablished themselves in North West Frontier province and the tribal territories along the border, beyond formal government from Islamabad.

There has also been an upsurge in violence against Nato forces in Afghanistan, which many analysts attribute to the Waziristan “peace deal”, on the ground that it removed the threat to the Taleban from Pakistan, allowing them to concentrate on a single front.

Some fear that this single deal has made the Nato campaign in southern Afghanistan impossible to win. Yet Musharraf clearly saw it as the least bad option, under huge pressure from his Army, which is said to have suffered more than 700 deaths in two and a half years of fighting in Waziristan.

The Bush Administration, which still firmly regards Musharraf as one of its best allies in the War on Terror, was sceptical about the deal but willing to give it a chance. Six weeks later it is no longer willing, and had begun to ask Musharraf to consider a change of tactics. The US would certainly not have welcomed an extension of the deal to Bajaur.

The suggested Blair visit to Pakistan, also intended to demonstrate support as well as talk about curbing the rising of militants within Britain, would be a further chance to ask whether Pakistan could do more to help Nato in Afghanistan.

These are Musharraf’s choices: to send a protesting Army back to fighting in the tribal areas; to strike targets from the air, risking accusations that children have been killed, and handing religious leaders easy propaganda; to strike more “peace deals” that give Taleban and other militants almost everything they want, and the US and Britain almost nothing.

They are barely choices. No surprise that he appears to be grasping at one after the other.

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