When Pervez Musharraf grabbed power nine years ago, toppling his civilian predecessor, it was to a roar of national approval and international condemnation.

Democracy had been usurped, screamed the West. But Pakistanis, weary of messy sectarian politics and weak and corrupt civilian rule, welcomed their new military leader.

As the former General Musharraf leaves, he goes less mourned at home than abroad. In Pakistan he is jeered by reformists and religious radicals alike. The country has succumbed to violence. The economy is in the doldrums.

It took the September 11 attacks to turn Mr Musharraf from global villain to Western hero. His bloodless coup had led to Pakistan being thrown out of the Commonwealth, the imposition of sanctions and a dive in foreign relations. But the iron grip he held on Pakistan was to prove to be a godsend for President Bush as Washington prepared to purge Afghanistan of al-Qaeda and their Taleban hosts.

The dust had not settled on Ground Zero when Mr Musharraf agreed to a series of “nonnegotiable” American demands, including an end to Pakistan’s support for the Taleban.

His cosiness with Washington was to become the defining relationship of his rule. It netted him $10 billion in American military assistance, much of which never reached the Army but filtered into the general budget, helping to fuel an economic boom. But it also enraged and radicalised large sections of Pakistani society and helped to recruit thousands to the growing Islamist cause.

In reality Mr Musharraf was playing a delicate double game. Pakistan’s murky Inter-Service Intelligence agency never severed its ties with the Taleban and Islamabad continued to provide cover for the militants even as they pocketed Washington’s millions.

Mr Musharraf became further beholden to the agency when it helped to engineer the acceptance of a 2002 referendum legitimising his rule. Parliamentary elections that year brought victory for conservative religious parties in the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, to whom he then turned for support. These alliances stymied his declared intention to tackle extremists.

Over the past year Washington’s enthusiasm started to pall, not least over his failure to halt a resurgent Taleban from attacking Afghanistan from their sanctuaries in Pakistan.

Washington, still anxious for a strong leader in Pakistan but increasingly concerned about Mr Musharraf’s broken promises of democratic change, hoped to persuade him to share power with Benazir Bhutto. Her assassination ended that plan.

A Congressional investigation revealed that the Pentagon knew of the diverted military aid but chose not to disrupt relations. But a diplomatic showdown took place when the CIA uncovered evidence that Pakistani intelligence agents had helped to plan the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.

Ultimately Mr Musharraf’s double game may have left Pakistan more precarious than before. The Taleban are now an internal Pakistani problem, as well as one for Afghanistan, with 56 domestic suicide attacks this year. That was not the legacy that Mr Musharraf sought to emphasise yesterday.

“Where was Pakistan in 1999?” he asked in his speech. “No one knew us, no one spoke to us and no one listened to us. Now we have put Pakistan on the map and people take notice.” True, but perhaps not for the right reasons.

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