On both sides of the Atlantic the Iraq war is proving as difficult for the party in opposition as the one in power. While American and British servicemen are dying there, criticism of the allied mission can sound unpatriotic. Senator John Kerry’s bad taste joke about underachieving youngsters ending up in Iraq spectacularly illustrated the danger.
The underlying question is whether opposition politicians, who in the main voted for the war, have any right to criticise the way things have turned out. When a US Democrat or a British Tory attacks the conduct of allied operations, he draws flak not just from his opponents in government but more sharply from those who always opposed the war.
In Britain, the Labour left, the Liberal Democrats, a few Tory grandees like Kenneth Clarke and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, along with a large clutch of journalists assert that the war was intrinsically wrong. They are intolerant of the argument that things might have been all right but for Donald Rumsfeld’s numerous blunders.
Such critics make it hard for David Cameron to make capital out of the Iraq fiasco. Indeed, the risk for the Conservative leader is that as he seeks wiggle room, he succeeds only in appearing slippery. So far from benefiting from Blair’s disaster, Cameron’s judgment is being questioned. Critics include pro-war Tories such as Quentin Davies, a former party defence spokesman. Yet again it seems that the shadow foreign secretary William Hague’s advice is responsible for Cameron’s embarrassment. The leader lost vital Jewish votes when Hague attacked Israel over Lebanon last summer.
There is a good deal of humbug about the present attacks on the Tory leader. Almost everyone — including many in office — believes that the Americans made catastrophic errors. That is not just the judgment of hindsight. Rumsfeld overruled the generals in sending a much lighter force than they recommended. Calls to plan for the post-invasion phase — not least from the British government — were ignored in Washington. Many wise heads counselled before the war that the Americans should not disband the Iraqi army and should remove only a few key Saddam Hussein henchmen from top positions, so as to leave a well functioning state in place.
The criticism of the Blair government is not so much that it misunderstood Iraq as that it failed to prevail with President Bush.
We cannot know what difference it would have made if America had pursued alternative policies. It is reasonable to think that it would have made some difference and perhaps a lot. But the Bush and Blair administrations argue that if you voted for the war you signed up for the whole ride (including their idiotic decisions). Anti-war campaigners take a similarly uncompromising stance and the public tends to agree.
So the Democrats have gone through the mid-term election campaign afraid to commit to an Iraq policy. Last week the Tories tried to distance themselves from the government but gained nothing. It was clumsy to vote for an inquiry into the conduct of the war, a proposal made by the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists. The Nationalists are regarded as crackpots by all other parties. Surely if the Conservatives had a new position on Iraq they should have initiated a debate themselves. Even opportunism needs to be properly planned.
In modern times aspiring prime ministers rarely have experience of foreign affairs. I can recall how flimsy Margaret Thatcher’s grasp of the issues was when she became leader of the opposition. I discussed foreign policy with Blair before he was prime minister and found him very lightweight on the subject. Cameron is now at that same stage of underdevelopment. If he becomes prime minister he will easily acquire gravitas as Thatcher and Blair did in office, but for the moment his ignorance makes him vulnerable. Foreign policy is unlikely to win him votes. Every time he ventures onto that ground he runs a risk.
Gordon Brown has probably said less about foreign policy (leaving aside debt relief) in nine years at the Treasury than Cameron in one year as party leader. But as chancellor he has been exposed to briefing and debate on every foreign issue. Brown has chosen to be taciturn but not out of ignorance. He will have the great advantage when prime minister that he did not lead us into the Iraq war.
Still, Brown’s Iraq policy will be dictated by Washington almost as much as Blair’s has been. Wearying as the death toll is, Brown’s reputation would not survive if he withdrew British forces ahead of the Americans. But as George Bush’s incumbency nears its end he need not be so close to this president as Blair has been. By the time of the next British election the United States will have a new leader. No candidate is going to reach the White House on a nakedly anti-war ticket, but the next president will nonetheless have a policy different from Bush’s. Brown will be prepared for that.
Once Tuesday’s mid-term elections are over, Bush must decide on a new approach to Iraq. Even substantial Republican losses this week might not circumscribe him too much. It is scarcely unusual for a two-term incumbent to lose one or both houses in his sixth year. If the Democrats are forced by electoral success into a leadership role, their divisions over Iraq will be painfully exposed.
On domestic issues America still predominantly accepts Republican values of small government and low taxes. The Democrats face an uncomfortable choice between acquiescing with that mood, or defying it and revealing how far they have shifted to the left since Clinton’s presidency.
Bush can think about Iraq knowing that he will face no more elections. He would like to ease the way for a Republican successor, but his own place in history will take priority. His main objective is to disguise as best he can America’s defeat in Iraq.
Whatever decisions he takes now, the execution of the policy will be highly dependent on events. For instance, he is likely to accelerate the transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqis, perhaps holding US forces as a reserve. But whether that policy is sustainable will depend on how much bloodletting occurs between the many Iraqi factions.
The trickiest decision for Bush could be how to deal with calls that are likely to come from the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (headed by James Baker, the Republican former secretary of state) to open a dialogue about Iraq with Syria and Iran. The British will surely favour such an approach, too.
It would be a leap in the dark. Both Syria and Iran have an interest in stabilising Iraq to keep at bay the flow of refugees and terrorism, but whether such a diplomatic démarche would reduce the killing in Iraq is pure guesswork. How the Bush administration could parley with countries that it demonises is also unclear. It might be convenient to share the blame with them for future disasters in Iraq, but embracing the “axis of evil” could not easily be presented as an American victory. The study group proposal will surely prove a bridge too far for Bush.
So it could be good for Cameron to take up the idea of regional dialogue with Syria and Iran. He cannot be blamed for looking for a way to end the conflict as opposed to raking over past errors. If the concept is favoured by Baker, it can hardly be lampooned as outlandish. Cameron could be in the joyous position of attacking the Labour government for not pursuing a policy that it is actually longing to pursue, held back only by Bush’s concern for posterity.
At last an opposition party might find a way to distance itself from government policy on Iraq without appearing hypocritical or shifty.
michael.portillo@sunday-times.co.uk
