The era of vigorous democracy promotion is apparently over. The “alliance of democracies” advocated by John McCain died with his bid for the US presidency. The “community of democracies” established at the UN by George Bush (with grudging EU support) is broken-backed. The problems we have run into fostering democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan have left a vastly diminished appetite (and capacity) for similar exercises.

In Britain, Robin Cook’s ethical foreign policy is a distant memory. And President Obama seems intent on doing pragmatic business with all nations — China, Russia and Iran included — quite independently of their domestic political arrangements. Indeed, his response to disturbances in Iran after the flawed elections has been strikingly cautious, precisely so as not to complicate other aspects of the relationship. Probably the most effective exercise in fostering democracy, extending EU membership to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, was firmly regional and now seems close to its natural limits.

There is good sense in this. It was always a fantasy that some coming together of democracies could replace the ill-functioning UN. Any such group would exclude countries crucial to tackling the most pressing items of international business. There is no dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions without Russia; nor North Korea’s without China. Second, the disagreements that so regularly paralyse the Security Council would afflict any group of leading democracies. South Africa has been a firm opponent of international action on Zimbabwe. India remains an outsider to the global non-proliferation regime. Finally, any grouping of democracies would lack the UN’s universality and, thus, its legitimacy and even its limited effectiveness.

But just because democracies cannot supersede the Security Council does not mean that there is no job for them to do together. The obvious one is precisely to foster democracy in countries where it is incipient or endangered — but in a rather more subtle way than was envisaged in the McCain proposal.

The unexpected starting point is the British Commonwealth. When I was responsible for Commonwealth matters in the Foreign Office in the 1990s Fiji and Pakistan parted ways with democracy, so faced suspension. I was very struck by the efforts both were ready to make — including assurances on a timetabled route back to democracy — to avoid this.

I don’t want to overstate this. I don’t suppose for one moment that, as General Musharraf contemplated his coup in 1999, possible suspension from the Commonwealth was at the top of his mind. And a decade later, Fiji remains firmly in the hands of a junta.

But in both cases exclusion from the Commonwealth contributed to internal criticism of the regime, and gave an extra argument to those calling for a return to democracy. So, at the margin, the “badge of respectability” offered even by such a low-profile organisation as the Commonwealth can add to internal pressures pushing a country in a more democratic direction.

One of the unheralded successes of the EU lies in precisely this area. Its fierce commitment to democratic values has unquestionably limited the influence of counter-democratic tendencies not only in members (notably in Eastern Europe), but also in countries such as Serbia and Turkey that aspire to membership.

So how do we apply this lesson outside the Commonwealth and Europe? What sort of organisation could offer a badge of respectability to states on the democratic edge?

We have the lessons of one, so far unsuccessful, experiment to draw on. The US-initiated “community of democracies” failed to make any real impact for two reasons. First, the poisonous post-Iraq relations between two groups of countries who ought to have been natural partners in such an enterprise — the US and key European states — fatally sapped the energies of the whole enterprise at its inception. But more pertinently, the conditions for admission were never properly set. The initial list was drawn up more or less by US fiat and included countries whose democratic credentials were questionable then, and have become even more so since.

Even though matters have improved, there is still no clear objective basis on which countries becoming democratic are admitted, or those ceasing to be are excluded.

It is down to the sort of politics that is bound to be distorted by considerations of national power and bilateral interests. In such circumstances the cases of influential states with questionable democratic credentials, such as Russia or Egypt, become a big problem. The degree of “respectability” conferred by belonging to a club where the criteria for membership are so opaque is necessarily very limited. As must be the club’s capacity to foster democracy in the wider world.

So any model must be based on a clear, objective test to distinguish the democratic sheep from the undemocratic goats. (Of course, in our imperfect world, politics always supervenes, but a test will, at least, hinder the politics from producing utterly indefensible results.) Here, then, is a suggestion. Starting, I hope, with the EU and the US working for once in partnership, we convene (or turn the “community of democracies” into) a “democratic compact”. The qualification for inclusion will be simple. A country must be willing to allow independent international observers to attend and report on its elections.

There is rather more to this than it sounds. Observers would have to operate during the campaign as well as the election, to be able to report on the admission of candidates and the freedom of their access to the media, for example. Even countries with such impeccable democratic qualifications as the UK might have to modify electoral law to allow observers full access to the balloting process. And the sourcing of observers would itself have to be watched. There are tainted sources, but also excellent ones such as the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). The core concept, however, could not be starker. If you hold an election judged by international experts to be free and fair, you are a democracy. And if not, not.

The badge of respectability for those inside could not shine brighter. You could have one high-profile meeting a year at which insiders could congratulate each other on their legitimacy, while outsiders looked on uncomfortably. The processes of entry and exit should be arranged to give maximum support to the forces for democracy in the countries concerned. Throw in some money (marginal by the standards of international development assistance, and undoubtedly well spent in terms of the improvement that decent democratic procedures bring to a nation’s wider prospects of economic development) to help poorer and aspiring members. All in all you could have an international organisation that, with minimal bureaucracy, offers a real prospect of making the world a better — or, at least, a more democratic — place.

Tony Brenton is the former British Ambassador to Moscow

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