In a few days time we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall; the collapse of a system, communism, which enslaved and slaughtered millions; the launching point for a new era of democracy and prosperity; a moment for unambiguous celebration everywhere.

Except Russia. It was, of course, Russia that inaugurated this momentous transformation (Mikhail Gorbachev really earned his Nobel Peace Prize). But the outcome, for Russians, was not the “end of history” but a decade of economic chaos and political collapse.

The demise of the “outer empire” with the fall of the wall was swiftly followed by that of the “inner empire” with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The “shock therapy” urged by so many Western economists was a disaster. There were no rules, institutions or habits to prevent the ruthless and unscrupulous from taking all they could. Everything — natural resources, politicians, the law — was for sale. A tiny minority made billions while the majority lost their savings, their job security, everything.

Unsurprisingly, politics turned sour. The country saw a military assault on its parliament, a dubious presidential election and the rapid rise of extreme nationalism. Externally, Russia underwent serial humiliation as the West insouciantly expanded Nato and took Kosovo from Serbia.

As so often in its history, Russia found a strong man to sort things out. Vladimir Putin became President in 2000. The next eight years for most Russians were good years. Through the magic of the market and a buoyant oil price, the economy doubled in size. Russians could suddenly afford luxuries and foreign travel. The barons of the Yeltsin era — overmighty provincial governors, billionaire oligarchs, megalomaniac press magnates — were tamed, locked up or exiled. The debilitating war in Chechnya was won. Russia began to assert itself again internationally as it turned off the gas to a troublesome Ukraine, faced down US missile deployment and crushed a provocative Georgia.

There was, of course, a price. While the forms of liberal democracy have been preserved, the reality is of a docile media, harassed opposition and manipulated elections. A state insulated from domestic criticism has become corrupt and rapacious. The pacification of Chechnya has been appallingly brutal. Troublesome journalists and businessmen have been exiled — or worse.

But there is no doubt that most Russians see this loss of freedoms as a small price to pay for prosperity and international respect. Mr Putin continues to enjoy the support of more than 60 per cent of Russians.

David Miliband is to visit Russia next week. This will be the first bilateral visit by a British foreign secretary since UK-Russian relations went through a deep low with the Alexander Litvinenko murder and the attacks on the British Council. As Mr Miliband knows well, dealing with today’s prickly, self-assertive Russia is going to be a long game. With due humility, I offer him five guidelines by which we should play it.

First, we should remain true to our own liberal principles. Russia is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. This gives us clear standing to criticise the more flagrant breaches — lawyers arrested, NGOs pressurised, journalists murdered. We should not, with our more pusillanimous European partners, be ready to turn a blind eye to bad behaviour. Russia does not respect weakness. And standing up for what we believe in strengthens those brave Russians who are working to improve their country.

Second, we should work with Russia where we can. Talk of a “new Cold War” is a grotesque exaggeration. Russia is not the revanchist troublemaker depicted in much of the Western press. Its foreign policy is based on a cautious assessment of its national interest. There is common ground that we should work to exploit. Russia is as keen as we are to stop Iran going nuclear and Afghanistan falling back into the hands of the Taleban. We have a joint contribution to make to cutting the world’s excessive stock of nuclear weapons. And there are vast gains to be made by expanding our mutual trade and investment.

Third, we should make it clear when Russia’s external behaviour becomes unacceptable. The murder of Litvinenko, the attacks on the British Council, the unilateral Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the cyber attack on Estonia all disrupted the international order. To let such behaviour pass is simply to invite more of the same. If we are clear where the limits are, we strengthen the hand of those inside Russia who argue that it should observe international norms more carefully.

Fourth, we should recognise that Russia is going to evolve only gradually and according to its own rhythms. It is unrealistic to believe that our behaviour can alone set Russia on a more co-operative and liberal path. We, with our partners, can be influential at the margins, but only there. We should accept that, for a while at least, Russia is going to remain a very challenging player on the international scene, and adjust our tactics accordingly.

But, finally, we should remain optimistic. Russia is a country that, in terms of both history and culture, knows itself to be profoundly European. As it looks around its borders, the least threatening one is that to the west. Its trade and investment links are heavily western orientated. The values to which it aspires are Western values. As its people grow more prosperous and more knowledgeable about the freedoms enjoyed by their Western neighbours, so they will grow less tolerant of the constraints under which they are forced to live.

While Russia’s feelings will be mixed as we celebrate the events of 1989, there is real reason to hope that the freedoms that came to Eastern Europe will, sooner rather than later, come to Russia as well.

Tony Brenton is the former British Ambassador to Moscow, 2004-08

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