Matthew Parris
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It has been hard over the past fortnight to avert our eyes for long from Helmand, and from the task facing the British Forces in Afghanistan. As I write there have been nine deaths in the past nine days, and - although perhaps it shouldn't - the fact that one was a woman has only sharpened the media spotlight. Sadly, the battle for Helmand is a good story. The plot is simple, the human tragedies poignant, the pride in victories real, and the photography amazing.
And yet an insistent voice within whispers that we needn't bother about Helmand. I mean this literally: not that Helmand doesn't matter but that we can be fairly confident of holding the line there. We can hold Helmand for as long as we try hard to. As an issue we can forget the ebb and flow of military fortune in southern Afghanistan because, though military fortune will always ebb and flow, there is no way our troops are going to sink.
British commanders in the field are right to say that the Taleban's resort to crude terrorism marks a retreat of a kind: an acknowledgement that it cannot gain victory in set-piece battle. And nor can we. And nor can the Taleban gain victory by terrorism. And nor can we gain victory over terrorism. And nor need the cost in blood deter us: the Boer War took a much crueller toll. And nor need the cost in treasure dismay us; it's a hefty whack we're paying for this but it isn't going to ruin the British economy.
It isn't, in the end, the way each day's skirmish goes that should preoccupy British policymakers. It's what the skirmishing is for, and whether this is achievable, that should trouble British minds, even as we mourn each loss and celebrate each victory.
I'm only 58 years old but I remember through boyhood six huge and sustained campaigns against local insurgencies that have dominated the news in my lifetime, four of them British. They are Cyprus, Kenya, Malaya, Aden, Algeria and Vietnam. And as I prepared to write this column I seemed to remember that in not one of them did military defeat occur; and nor was the fear of military defeat what caused (in every case but one) our withdrawal or that of our allies. The exception was Malaya, which we won, but a key difference there was that most of the insurgents belonged to a minority race.
But as to the others, was my memory correct? Using the Times Archive, I decided to check. How did this newspaper's leading articles reflect some of these conflicts?
It is absorbing to read those old accounts. The Times took a consistently ambivalent and less hawkish line than The Daily Telegraph, but there is a pattern and it is depressingly clear.
At first we announce that the insurgents must be beaten. We list the reasons, usually headed by a “thin end of the wedge” argument about the network of alliances and commitments upon which security depends. We are confident that the insurgents do not represent the majority of the native population, who approve of our efforts.
As the conflict drags on, we note that the insurgents are resorting to terrorist methods of the most cowardly sort. We observe that this threatens our popularity among the majority population, because of the intrusive methods we need to adopt to keep the terrorists at bay.
Throughout we report successes and setbacks, the dominant tone being guardedly optimistic that the battle is being won so long as we redouble our efforts, send as many troops as necessary, and stay the course. Where the ruling administration is not ours (French or American, for instance) we are more doubtful about the chance of victory. Where we are in charge, the doubt caused by stalemate comes later.
After three or four years of fighting, we start to talk about a “settlement”, which we describe as (and genuinely persuade ourselves to be) a progressive and honourable move. We insist, in the immediate, that the military effort must be maintained, but that the battle - a battle for hearts and minds - will not be won by military means. Give-and-take may be necessary. And in the end we withdraw, never saying (even to ourselves) that we are retreating, and wish everyone well.
Take Aden:
December 31, 1964. “[The terrorist] campaign in Aden has been misconceived and mistimed and will misfire, whatever toll of innocent life the terrorists may take, and brag of, at the outset... Any appreciable reduction in the [commitment] is scarcely feasible.”
April 4, 1966. “The hope is that [regional delegates to a conference] will agree upon a combined Government with authority to... treat with Britain on the transference of power. Terrorism will then come to an end, because it will have no further purpose.”
Or Cyprus:
June 22, 1956. “There are many promising signs... the military drive against Eoka, the Cypriot terrorist organisation, will be continued.”
October 11, 1956. “Terrorism can and will be destroyed by military means, but time is needed... Ordinary Cypriots would welcome a new truce offer by the terrorists.”
August 4, 1958. “Terrorism in Cyprus has sunk to new depths of foulness. The gunmen who shot Sergeant Hammond, of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, in the back... are murderers of the most cowardly kind.”
Or Kenya:
November 8, 1952. “There have been welcome signs that law-abiding citizens of all races are co-operating with the security forces... there can be no going back on the course which Britain set herself...”
February 17, 1953. “The Armed Forces... have conducted wide and successful sweeps through the affected areas... the volume and accuracy of intelligence reports seem to be increasing.”
May 6, 1954. “Some 370 Africans have now been executed by hanging and 150 more are under sentence of death... anxiety cannot fail to be felt at the high number of executions...”
Enough. None of these cases is the same either as each other or as Afghanistan. But militarily we were in every case able to hold our own (or better) until the question “can we?” was replaced with the question “why”, as casualties and costs showed no sign of abating and the ingrained nature of our opponent's position looked harder to alter.
In Northern Ireland it was arguably the terrorists, not we, whose acceptance that victory was impossible broke the stalemate.
It is time the “why?” overtook the “can we?” in Afghanistan too. Enthusiasts for staying the course regardless are not without an answer. It is that we are giving a fledgeling democracy under an elected President, Hamid Karzai, the time and space to grow strong. That is the dream, and if it appeared that it was coming to pass I would be with the hawks.
But is it? This, and not the tides of war in Helmand, is the question. This is the story.

Matthew Parris joined The Times as parliamentary sketchwriter in 1988, a role he held until 2001. He had formerly worked for the Foreign Office and been a Conservative MP from 1979-86. He has published many books on travel and politics and an autobiography, Chance Witness, for which he won the 2004 Orwell Prize. His diary appears in The Times on Thursdays, and his Opinion column on Saturdays
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I cannot believe Parris is comparing the efforts of Britain to HOLD ONTO her colonies against native insurgencies with the efforts to assist the Afghan Government in resisting the return to power of Islamic fanatics who seek to reassert a Saudi version of Islamic oppression upon the Afghan people.
Chris, San Fernando Valley, USA
Afghanistan will always remain the graveyard for foreign adventurers. How dare we buck the trend/
Ian cheese, london, uk
David Curtis London:
I never said that the U.S. shouldn't have stayed more focused on Afghanistan rather than Iraq. But you have not addressed my point--"what could we expect if a compromise with the Taliban was reached?" My bet is that we will get more violence elsewhere.
Steve Kraft, San Jose,
He has a point. Two paintings by Kenneth McDonough in John WR Taylor's Aerial Warfare show RAF Bristol fighters attacking Afgan tribesmen and the evacuation of civilians in Kabul by air with Vickers Victoria aircraft. This was in 1928-29 is history repeating itself? Remember Russia failed too!
robin, Abingdon, UK
An excellent analysis, but one that misses the key issue - that insurgencies and campaigns such as the one in Helmand are fundamentally different to those previously experienced, in both character and context. The Army as usual chose to apply formulaic responses, based on these previous campaigns.
Alan Fanning, Marlborough, UK
We should follow Rory Stewart's advice. Withdraw from Helmand and consolidate in areas where we have control.
Jim, Kingston-upon-Thames, UK
History seems to teach us nothing at all. The lessons of Oman are still taught at Sandhurst. Why bother?
Mike Poulsen, Reading, Berkshire
Why is it unsafe for troops in Afghanistan to be moved by helicopter? When they do fly, why so low? Perhaps if we knew who taught the Taliban to use Stinger missiles we'd know why.
Douglas Miller, Fulham,
Not six, but seven. Count Northern Ireland.
David Short, London,
In the British examples you give, we had a right and duty to be there (in contemporaneous context).
We have no reason to be, or to have been in Afghanistan, and so no reason to 'talk' to the othere side.
They are asking nothing of us that we can concede. The word limit prevents me to go further.
David Short, London,
Steve Kraft, San Jose. If what you say is true, why did the US invade Afghanistan and walk away we don't do nation building wasting a huge amount of energy and resources on the pointless invasion of Iraq?
David Curtis, London, UK
Spot on. T paraphrase go: those who do not learn from history are prone to relive it as a tragedy.
Another notable example perhaps is napalmed old Greece during the 1940's-1950's civil war which was costly in Greek lives as WW2.
Yet its Communist Party is back with its own national tv and radio!
Nicholas Xenakis, Borough, London, England, Britain
Why then while we yet in Afghanistan do we not deal with and stop the production of the poppy?
Francis Stephens, Stanford Le hope, UK
The cover story is that Vietnam was lost on the home front, but the truth is different. US forces were withdrawn because of sustained acts of mutiny within combat ground forces, and major acts of sabotage on capital ships. From 1968, officers were more in fear of their men than the enemy. Check it.
Andrew Milner, Karuizawa, Japan
The French army in Algeria were arguably winning the military battle against the FLN in the 1960s but their politicians had lost on the political front. Similarly in Afghanistan I suspect that by losing the struggle for hearts and minds the West is going to lose the political fight.
Andrew Morrow, County Donegal, Ireland
History shows without exception that there can never be a victory in Afghanistan. No matter how noble the cause, war in Afganistan is doomed to a humiliating defeat and withdrawl.
I therefore wonder if there are not other motives at work here.
I salute our troops but feel very sorry for them.
J Nowland, Leeds, United Kingdom
An army trained for conventional warfare is always in trouble when confronting a guerilla force. Examples: in Afghanistan, NATO and allied forces, in Pakistan, Pakistani Army. Nobody learnt the lesson which Afghans taught invading Soviet forces (though with the backing of US, Pakistan and Europe).
Shiraz, Karlskrona,
Even allowing for the Carter administration financing the Mujahadeen to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan, why oh why did the Thatcher government agree to allow the SAS to train them? Come on Matthew, you should know, you were a Tory MP in those days.
Paul, Coventry,
Good article, but one major error- the war in Vietnam was not an insurgency; but an attack against the Republic of Vietnam by its neighbour (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam), with the full material and diplomatic support of China and the Soviet Union, and the deployment of a million-man army.
William Bauer, Hensall, Canada
The rassians had a clear ethnic cleansing agenda, they not only massacared ethnic afghans(pashtoons 65%),but they also published propaganda census showing pashtoons between 32% and 42%. The same figure is adopted by UK/US. this way they can claim that majority of Afghans are with them not Taliban.
Marshall, London, UK
Good article, but apparently our government is waiting to see who wins the US presidential election.
Take them out, spend the money saved on our poorest citizens.
M. Williams, Oxford, UK
Is the idea that the US had to invade Afghanistan to deprive Bin Laden of sancutuary? If so what are the chances of convincing US intelligence (sic) that Bin Laden is hiding in Zimbabwe?
haralambos, johannesburg, south africa
But I recall that the Mau Mau were defeated, although some of the methods were certainly questionable. You also didn't mention the success in Borneo in the 1960's. So including Malaya and Oman that's four insurgencies the UK defeated, which rather messes up your theory !
Roddy Nicolson, Shetland, UK
The people fighting against colonial/US rule have always been called terrorists and now insurgents. I call them freedom fighters, in all the above mentioned countries and a lot more.
adam, liverpool, u
Matthew's right about the fact that if a majority are against
you, you cannot win against insurgents (South-Ireland) but
if they are a minority they cannot win (North-Ireland). So the
question is do the majority support the Iraqi National Government and the Afghan National Government?
Hardy, Bideford, UK
Sorry, mealy mouthed article.
US had a quarrel with the Talebs for sheltering Bin Laden, due to Afghan notions of blood debt and hospitality.
Agree to allow them to compete in new elections, in exchange for ensuring no presence of Al Qaeda.
But the US won't agree.
UK has NO business in Afghanistan.
Linda Stewart, Cranbrook, Kent
This stuff about how they "will follow us home" is wrongheaded. "Any part of Helmand you turn over to the Taliban will be a training ground for attacks all over the world tomorrow". Ironic that an American should say that, as the USA has dropped far more bombs and killed more people worldwide.
Tom Welsh, Basingstoke,
but, the wars/insurgencies quoted by Mr Parris have one key factor they are wars being fought by peoples to free themselves of colonial rule. Hence, you the British will always be viewed as the oppressors. in iraq and afghanistan we seek to aid and support the local albeit qualified administrations
musfaffa, eastwood notts, uk
But the British created the Irish problem in the first place. It was resolved in the way it should have been 25 years ago. As for Afganistan, we have lost the battle there. Hearts and minds are against us. We now have to search for a graceful exit a la Iraq (ie., we've done our job :)). Pathetic.
Col. John Bowers-Strachane, Coldstream, Scotland
The "why" might be to stop Islamic fundamentalism and to give secular humanist values a chance to flourish. The same war was fought in the past in Europe leading to the Age of Reason and benefits for huge numbers in freedom and prosperity.
Is this winnable or laudable in Afgh, that's the debate.
peter, ulaanbaatar, mongolia
What a wonderful analogy. Too bad that the governing bodies don't take to read ;your article. The same can be said about Iraq, which the US government pursues in its own selfish interest for oil.
shirley mccaughey, albuquerque, usa
OK as far as it goes, but you forget the issue of how those compromises were obtained. Had the British shown no willingness to fight the IRA to a standstill, would we ever have obtained the Good Friday Agreement?
My guess is that without the Army ops in NI, the IRA would now control Liverpool.
jon livesey, Sunnyvale, CA/USA
Surely it is better that the Islamists trained in Pakistani madrassas are fighting fully armed and trained British Paratroops in Helmland than blowing up women and children in shopping malls in the UK.
We can always leave Afghanistan, but unlike the Mau Mau or Eoka they will simply follow us home.
miko, Singapore,
You may be right, but thankfully Britain is not in charge and are not being relied upon. It's the good old USA and Canada who will carry the can.
Glen, Toronto,
And what exactly is the compromise you suggest Mr. Parris? This isn't the Mau Mau, who had no interest training people for attacks in London or New York. Any part of Helmand you turn over to the Taliban will be a training ground for attacks all over the world tomorrow.
Steve Kraft, San Jose,
Can he explain the Oman isurgency of the sixties / seventies?
Rob, Liverpool, England
brilliant
please do not publish my name or email address
I have a relative there
Name withheld on request., paris , france