That sentiment could be applied to the violence that has occurred in the Middle East since Wednesday. The outside world is largely looking at it through one eye, assuming that Israel, although provoked, has needlessly escalated the situation to the point where it is said to be “out of control”, the region is “on the brink of war” and as a result, in the words of the Arab League on Saturday, “the Middle East peace process is dead”.

The rest of the world is also, understandably, so appalled at the “speedometer” — the exchange of rockets and bombs between Hezbollah and the Israeli Air Force, the deliberate targeting of civilians by the former and the unavoidable but invariably unintended taking of some innocent lives by the latter — that is cannot focus on the “road”, the broader political context that has created this conflict and that threatens more for years to come.

Employing a second eye — that is, seeing things as does Ehud Olmert, Israel’s Prime Minister — is instructive. The international community allows that his country has “a right to exist”, of course, but believes that Israel would be advised not to shout too loudly about it to its neighbours. It has a duty to defend itself, of course, but must do so in a “proportionate” and “balanced” fashion, although what this might be is ambiguous.

It should not inflict “collective punishment” on the Palestinians or Lebanese. Yet, when it decides on what might be called “individual punishment” — that is, taking out people who have, and who don’t deny holding, significant positions in organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah — then this is condemned too.

In the dreadful circumstances, Mr Olmert has been “proportionate” and “balanced”, as is acknowledged by the United States and Britain and, privately, officials in Egypt, Jordan and Saudia Arabia. Awful as the television pictures of the past few days have been, events are not “out of control”, the region is not “on the brink of war” in anything like the manner of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, or even 1982, nor is the peace process any more alive or dead than it was three weeks ago when Hamas raised the stakes by launching its raid into Israel and kidnapping a corporal.

The “speedometer” is mostly misleading. Israel is, explicitly, attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon, not Lebanon. It is doing so principally through air power and trying its best to avoid being drawn into the heavy presence on the ground in southern Lebanon from which it extricated itself in 2000. In military terms, most of what Israel today wants to achieve can probably be accomplished comparatively swiftly. The exchange of fire is unlikely to last for weeks or months, despite appearances to the contrary.

The real and disturbing developments, though, concern the road on which the region is heading. And the human symbols of this are the three captured Israeli soldiers. In a harsh and dispassionate sense, Mr Olmert would be in an easier place if they had died along with their comrades. As matters stand, they may present the Prime Minister with an enduring hostage crisis. Hamas would probably be willing to agree to an exchange for Palestinian prisoners, an outcome that would boost its domestic popularity. Israel has conducted such bargains before and Mr Olmert could tolerate doing so again, while pledging to deal with those responsible for this outrage later.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, is more likely to play for time, to move its captives hundreds of miles from where they were abducted and to release harrowing videos at sensitive moments to taunt ministers in Jerusalem. This would ignite turmoil in Lebanon.

That such a standoff can take place reflects a profound change in Middle East politics. War and peace there used to occur between states — Israel and its neighbours. Whatever might be declared publicly, there were private contacts and an informal code of conduct between national actors.

The notion of a Middle East peace process still rests on the premise that states can negotiate with one another. But recent events indicate that the authority of several states surrounding Israel has slipped to the point of incredibility. Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad count for more than the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon and Syria. And while some of these groups have been sponsored by states (particularly Syria), they are now strong enough to exercise independence from their old masters.

Even if Syria and Iran wanted to close Hezbollah, they could no longer do so.

The final element is that the Middle East has ceased to be an argument of its own; it has become enmeshed in and sometimes a theatre for other conflicts and controversies. A whole series of rivalries — Arab-Israeli, Shia militia and Sunni fanatics in Iraq, Iran and its nuclear ambitions, the activities of al-Qaeda and a revitalised Taleban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the contest over Kashmir — have become entangled with one another.

During the Cold War era, the superpower struggle was a blessing in disguise for the Middle East — it put a limit on how much humiliation Israel or its Arab rivals could be allowed to inflict on each other. In the area today, the reverse is the case. Even if the preconditions for the fabled “two-state” solution between Israel and the Palestinians could be brought about, outside players would be able to sabotage it.

Dayan was right. What matters is the road. That road has rarely looked more perilous.

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