Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, insisted yesterday that the fighting in Mogadishu, the capital of neighbouring Somalia, would be over “in days rather than weeks”. If recent history is any indication, this is an optimistic and improbable prediction. While supporters of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) appear to have chosen not to make a stand in the city that they have controlled for the past six months, they are unlikely to have disappeared from the picture entirely. There is every chance that they will regroup in the south of this tormented country or bide their time in Mogadishu itself before hitting back at their enemies. Somalia had not witnessed a functioning administration for 15 years. It will be fortunate to find itself with one now.

The intervention by Ethiopian troops has, nevertheless, been dramatic. A mere ten days ago, the Islamists who had brought some sort of order to Mogadishu but at the price of imposing their own extreme doctrines, were threatening that they would remove the official interim Government led by Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed from the remote town of Baidou where it had been based. That bluster offered Addis Ababa the alibi (and it was not looking for much of a pretext) to send in thousands of soldiers. Either the UIC did not expect this reaction or it wildly overestimated its chances of fending off what is, by the standards of this region, an organised army. Mogadishu has thus changed hands again. The shooting and looting reported yesterday suggest that the city may soon return to a state of utter chaos.

That could easily be true of the whole country and the states that surround it. The politics of Somalia have long been based on clan loyalties, religious affiliation and the law of the gun. The alliance between Ethiopia and the official interim Government is one of convenience, and there are enormous tensions within the Somali side as well. The division of the spoils that will follow will leave some factions aggrieved, and they will be tempted to take up arms again. Eritrea, which found it convenient to back the UIC, will not want its large neighbour to hold influence in the whole of Somalia. It will be tempted to throw more resources behind the Islamists in the hope of undermining the tenure of President Ahmed.

The worst case scenario is, therefore, deeply unappealing. Somalia would become the East African equivalent of Lebanon during the 1980s. Civil strife would be compounded by outside intervention by powers with interests of their own. The consequences for the impoverished population in this case would be even more catastrophic.

A political solution, as improbable as it seems, is the only hope for real stability. A UN Security Council resolution remains on the table even if the African states that pressed for this peacekeeping mission — and are supposed to lead it — are still badly divided on what to do next. The best outcome would be for such a force to enter Mogadishu and for all-party talks to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. That dialogue should in turn permit a ceasefire.

Ethiopia may well conclude, however, that having won an apparent military victory at speed it has no need for diplomacy or deliberations. Yet Addis Ababa would be unwise to believe that it can impose a solution. It should know enough about this part of the world to realise that entering Somalia is an easier enterprise than leaving.