The deep south of Somalia and the far west of China might appear to have very little in common. Yet the coincidence of what has happened in these two places in the past few days may indicate a coming confluence of interests for Washington and Beijing. American forces have targeted extremists driven out of Mogadishu by the Ethiopian-backed interim Government. Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities launched a distinctly American-style raid on an alleged terror camp thought to be run by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement deep in the mountainous western Xinjiang region. In each case the objective was to disable individuals and units allied to al-Qaeda and responsible for the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 in the first case and, allegedly, a spate of attacks on facilities linked to Beijing.

There are, inevitably, risks and difficulties in the approaches adopted by the US and China. Washington cannot be blamed for seizing a rare chance to damage extremists in Somalia. But it is impossible to do this is a truly surgical fashion. The Union of Islamist Courts, which until last month held sway in the Somali capital, includes a number of dedicated fanatics with a direct correction to international terrorism but also a host of other characters. Any assault led from the air must rely upon intelligence on the ground to be effective, and this is a part of the world in which the distinction between rumour and evidence is not all that it might be. Furthermore, the US has to be careful not to be seen as excessively close to the Ethiopians in Somalia as their presence, were it to extend for months, not weeks, will become the source of much Somali resentment.

China also has to take care to be discriminating. It is not “unpatriotic”, let alone treasonous, for Chinese citizens to follow Islam. The majority of those who reside in Xinjiang province are Islamic and the overwhelming majority of that majority have no connection to religious zeal- otry. There are, however, hard cases whose opposition to Beijing extends well beyond nationalism or the understandable historical grievances of the Uighurs who come from this part of China. There are terrorists operating from the border with Pakistan who have been trained elsewhere in the world; indeed a number were captured in Afghanistan when the Taleban and al-Qaeda fell back in 2001. It might be easier for the Chinese to identify their enemies more precisely than it is for the US military in Somalia but this is still far from a precise enterprise.

Yet China’s recognition that it has common interests with the United States is significant. At times, Beijing has offered the impression that it had no Islamist threat within its borders at all or that it can deal with this in isolation. It would be wise for China to make common cause not only with the United States but others such as India and Pakistan in sharing intelligence, comparing anti-terrorism techniques and, on occasion, formally co-ordinating anti-terrorism measures. It makes sense for Washington and Beijing to work more closely in developing policies towards countries — such as Iran — that aspire to sponsor global terrorism. Much has been written (and overwritten) about how the US and China are destined to spend this century as rivals. In reality, their mutual progress will depend on the extent of their co-operation.