George W. Bush’s address last night has been portrayed as signalling a “surge” in America’s military activities in Iraq. But “surge” rather exaggerates what might be better thought of a shift in resources. An extra 21,500 troops will be concentrated in Baghdad, where the worst Shia-Sunni violence has occurred, and in Anbar province, which has been the centre of the so-called insurgency. This represents, though, an increase of a modest 15 per cent in American force levels. It is, however, implicit recognition that more soldiers should have been sent some time ago. Of itself, it does not indicate that the United States will keep its Army in Iraq for a longer period than previously expected. Indeed, it may only be by putting more boots on the ground now that the United States (and Britain) can leave Iraq in an orderly, honourable and timely manner.

In military terms, therefore, this is not a radical initiative. It could be argued that, ideally, even more troops should be sent, but it does not seem to be practical to move a much higher number into Iraq quickly. It is better to begin to make an impact in Baghdad swiftly, deploying men who have experience of the region, rather than to wait for more units with little knowledge of the Middle East to become available. For that reason, respected figures occupying the centre of the US political spectrum, such as John McCain and Joe Lieberman, have backed this policy.

The increase in troops is, in any case, but one part of a broader reorientation. Not only the US Army but also the Iraqi Army will be more prominent in Baghdad and more determined to root out fanatics. There will be a significant increase in the money spent on reconstruction and infrastructure in Iraq, an injection that will assist an economy already expanding, despite the pessimists’ fears. The new US commitment is contingent on the administration in Baghdad improving its performance. The measures that are expected include a drive against the Shia militias that have mushroomed in the capital, reaching an accord on the distribution of oil revenues between the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish communities, and easing some of the restrictions imposed on those who were once part of the Baath party. This is at least as much a political as a military package. It will need to be implemented as such if it is to achieve the success that should be hoped for it.

In reality, there is no credible alternative. The Iraq Study Group proved rather better at setting out the many problems that exist in Iraq than in offering precise solutions. Its recommendation that the White House co-opt Iran and Syria as its allies in Iraq does not look remotely plausible. The idea that suddenly withdrawing American soldiers from the country would convince Shia and Sunni hardliners to be more charitable to one another is equally improbable. Mr Bush’s domestic foes, notably Nancy Pelosi, the new Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives (who has a minimal record in foreign policy) and the increasingly surreal Edward Kennedy, would simply abandon Iraq and be done with it.

This is not a course that the United States can afford to take. Mr Bush’s decision involves serious risks and it is inevitable that more American soldiers will die as a result of being sent to dangerous sections of Baghdad. Nor is this destined to be a wildly popular announcement at home. It is right, nevertheless, to make one more effort to create the sort of Iraq that its people deserve and the vast majority of its citizens aspire to. These are the appropriate means to what is a noble end.