Much is being read into Tony Blair’s statement on Iraq yesterday that he did not read out. It is being claimed, for example, that withdrawing some British troops from the Basra area at the same time as the United States in building up its forces in the Baghdad region represents a serious split between London and Washington. Others have concluded that while his announcement covered, strictly speaking, a reduction in force numbers of 1,600 men soon and 500 more by late summer — leaving a substantial presence of 5,000 — the real message being delivered was of a phased withdrawal of all soldiers by 2008.

Such thinking represents the triumph of prejudices over evidence. As Mr Blair sought to emphasise in the House of Commons, the positions in Basra and Baghdad are very different. British troops have not had to deal with a Sunni insurgency or much in the way of Shia-on-Sunni violence. What they have faced instead are radical Shia militias (often backed by and from Iran) seeking to assert themselves as much over their traditional leaders as against British military commanders. Their strategy has been based on the infiltration of police units along with direct strikes against British targets. Operation Sinbad appears to have severely curtailed their activities. It makes sense, in this context, to redeploy UK forces, releasing some to leave Iraq in the process, and allow the Iraqi Army to take command.

Baghdad, by contrast, is less a crucible of “resistance” to an American “occupation” than a battleground for Iraqi-on-Iraqi conflict. With 80-90 per cent of all the violence in the country occurring in the capital it makes immense sense for the US and Iraqi administrations to redouble their efforts in the city. The latest Baghdad security initiative has made an encouraging start and might bear more fruit than cynical critics would like to concede is possible.

Even so, Britain should not be rushing to leave southern Iraq on an artificial timetable. With some fortune, it may indeed be possible to draw down force numbers to well below 5,000 men by the end of 2008. Much, however, depends on the development of the Iraqi Army, which now has 130,000 troops (making it larger than the entire British Army is), political developments in Basra and whether Iran continues to be a very malign player in the area. There is little doubt that fanatics will try to force the pace of the British troop movements on terms that suit them. They could sense that British public sentiment favours complete withdrawal sooner rather than later. It is up to Mr Blair and his successor in No 10 to convince Iraqis that the political resolve to see through this mission remains undiminished.

Iraqis are increasingly determining the fate of Iraq. That process will accelerate but it does require assistance. While this should not, hopefully, demand a large outside military presence it would be rash to assume that the entire infrastructure of a working government, a comprehensively trained army and a corruption-free police force will be in place in just two years.

The Iraqi Cabinet has shown more energy and urgency of late, not only in placing more resources into establishing order inside Baghdad, but in addressing the vexed but essential question of the fair distribution of oil revenues among the country’s 18 provinces. That in turn should allow for a fresh focus on political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. This statement may be the beginning of the end for Britain’s role in Iraq. The end itself will not come for some time yet.