For the past six months the border area between Israel and Lebanon has been relatively peaceful. Israel withdrew its troops, as it had pledged to do, sizeable reinforcements representing the United Nations moved in and Hezbollah drew back and stopped launching its rocket attacks into northern Israel. The whereabouts of the two captured members of the Israel Defence Force whose seizure triggered the clash last summer remains unknown, but they are such a valuable prize for the terrorists who captured them that is can be assumed that they are still alive. Meanwhile, though, the internal politics of Lebanon has not improved in the slightest, with a brave administration seeking to remain in office despite the intrigue against it being orchestrated by Syrian interests and supported by local political parties which are explicitly linked to Hezbollah.

What might occur if the Lebanese Cabinet falls is becoming apparent. As we report today, Hezbollah and its sympathisers have been buying up villages (often for lavish sums) in territory which was previously owned either by Christians or members of the Druze community. The sums of money involved are substantial and often paid in cash packed into suitcases. This is not idle property speculation. The pattern of this acquisition is not accidental either. These purchases will create a continuous Shia zone running from the edge of the long-disputed Shebaa Farms area all the way across to the coastline. Lebanon is in effect being physically divided by this initiative. This is terrain in which Hezbollah will soon be able to function much as it wishes. It is beyond the reach of the UN and its soldiers. It is already being described in the region as a “new Maginot Line”.

There is, though, a crucial difference. The original Maginot Line was defensive in its character. This one is not. Hezbollah is in effect preparing for the next war, which is one that it would initiate. There is already evidence that this organisation has been seeking to restock its arsenal with more sophisticated missiles than the relatively primitive rockets which it directed towards villages inside Israel last year but often missed their targets. It is widely suspected that Iran is the principal supplier of this hardware and that Syria is actively allowing these weapons to be transported across its borders. Hezbollah could, therefore, be in a position by this summer in which it could fire missiles over the land south of the Litani river, which is controlled by the UN force, and strike at Israeli civilians. The domestic pressure on Israel to respond by bombing would be huge.

The international tension which a fresh round of conflict here would provoke may suit the Iranian leadership. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared yesterday that Iran’s nuclear programme involved “no reverse gear” just as representatives of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council prepare to meet in London to discuss additional sanctions against Tehran. If past form is any indication, Iran will try to play for time by exploiting its capacity to cause trouble in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. It is likely to engage in those tactics yet again.

The absence of overt activity in the vicinity of the Israel-Lebanon boundary has led some commentators to suggest that Hezbollah might want to act in a less confrontational fashion. The clear implication of these land deals across southern Lebanon is that it has no such benign intentions.