The risible attempt by the chief cleric to escape in a burka from the rebellious Red Mosque, besieged by Pakistani security forces in the heart of Islamabad, was humiliating for him and his extremist followers. After Maulana Abdul Aziz was caught, abandoning those he had urged in firebrand sermons to prepare for suicide attacks, he meekly called on them to surrender. At least 1,000 have already given up, and despite threats by about 30 armed militants against the women and children inside, the army appears ready to wait until the remaining 1,000 students, without food, water or electricity, are forced to surrender.

A government victory, however, will come at a high price. Most people in the Pakistani capital have been appalled by the mosque’s tactics in its campaign over the past six months to impose Sharia. To enforce a Taleban-style regime, male and female students from the two associated Islamic seminaries have led forays to kidnap alleged prostitutes, including six Chinese nationals, attack police, incite violence, call for the overthrow of President Musharraf and terrorise shops, libraries and groups seen as “unIslamic”. But the Red Mosque enjoys strong support in Pakistan’s unruly tribal areas, where the clash has been seen as a symbol of General Musharraf’s weakness in the face of the growing defiance of many groups – tribal, ethnic and Islamist – of his authority.

Many Westernised Pakistanis blame the President for allowing the confrontation to drag on, accusing him of using it to distract attention from the protests against his dismissal of the Chief Justice and his plans to stand again for office while remaining head of the army. They accuse him of exploiting the issue to show the West that he is tackling Islamist extremism and deflect criticism of his recent deal with the tribal areas that has made them a safe haven for Afghan Taleban. His supporters insist that he has had to be patient to avoid bloodshed and further polarisation of Pakistan’s febrile society.

This polarisation has already made Pakistan all but ungovernable. The Government has been forced into a stand-off in the vast North West Frontier Province, where the army has been unable to subdue tribal leaders. In North and South Waziristan there is equal defiance of central authority, and al-Qaeda leaders can direct a global network with impunity. In Baluchistan, a separatist uprising, fuelled by grievances over earnings from energy exports, is still raging. In big cities such as Karachi, regular clashes between Sunni and Shia militants have left hundreds dead.

Nationwide violence, a coup or a successful assassination attempt (there have been many plots already) would be a catastrophe, not only for Pakistan but for regional peace. Pakistan is reaping a bitter harvest from years of internal division, the failure of social and economic reform, growing sectarian division and the cynical exploitation by rulers, especially Zia ul-Haq, of Islamic sentiment to gain advantage in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This politicisation of Islam has weakened the army, the powerful ISI intelligence service and the fissiparous political fabric. General Musharraf is hoping that a deal with the exiled Benazir Bhutto, who would return as Prime Minister, will mean that he can avoid declaring martial law. For that prospect, Pakistanis fear, would provoke confrontation with Islamists not only in Islamabad but right across the country.