When Pakistani special forces launched their assault on the Red Mosque in Islamabad, the army asked for 400 white shrouds for the dead. Mercifully, not all of them have been used. There is still no accurate tally of the militants killed in the operation, though among them was Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the radical cleric who had turned the mosque and its adjoining madrassa into a rebel fortress in the heart of Pakistan’s capital. As the clean-up began yesterday it seemed likely that hostages would be found among the dead, and critics rightly asked why such an enclave was allowed to form in the first place. But the violence could have been far worse. President Musharraf’s decision to clear the mosque by force appears to have been carried out with relative restraint, and to have had broad public support.

General Musharraf appears to have breathing space. He would be very wrong, however, to interpret this as a vote of confidence in the febrile status quo over which he presides eight years after taking power in a bloodless coup. Pakistan’s crisis remains acute. A cleric and his followers who, as the general said, defamed both Islam and Pakistan were nonetheless allowed to assert a deeply unpopular form of vigilante justice for six months without government intervention. Meanwhile, despite widespread public protest, the general has pursued a personal vendetta against his own former Chief Justice for threatening to deny him a further term in power.

There is a twofold explanation for Islamabad’s cautious handling, until now, of its militant fifth column. The military’s claim to political clout has rested on an uneasy accommodation with minority fundamentalists ever since a coup brought General Zia ul-Haq to power in 1977. Even now, overreaction by the authorities could tear the country apart if support for the Red Mosque’s victims from Waziristan to the North West Frontier Province turns into open revolt. But those killed have little to no backing from the moderate majority on whom Pakistan’s cohesion ultimately depends. It is this majority that General Musharraf must heed.

For months, the general’s “secret” talks with Benazir Bhutto have been the worst-kept secret in Pakistani politics. They are aimed at a deal that would give him another five-year term as President and her the freedom to return from self-imposed exile as head of her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Ms Bhutto’s record inspires little confidence in her competence, and her capacity to inflame religious radicals constitutes a real threat to Pakistan’s stability. But she can deliver parliamentary support for General Musharraf after elections scheduled for September. Such support would not constitute the return to democracy that he has always promised, but it would be a first step, and safer for Pakistanis and the world than the alternatives.

No deal with the PPP would condemn Pakistan to a de facto military dictatorship – but only if General Musharraf were able to retain unquestioned control of the military and to defy the simmering insurrection being mounted by supporters of the deposed Chief Justice. If not, the road would be open to nuclear-armed anarchy. The general must swallow his pride, agree terms with Ms Bhutto and start Pakistan on a long journey back to civilian rule. Nothing else offers a long-term defence against extremism.