Gordon Brown yesterday dismissed the notion that he was distancing himself from the United States and the special relationship as “nonsense”. Such forthright language is welcome, but the suggestion has acquired credibility because of his own decision to appoint Lord Malloch-Brown, a compulsive critic of the White House, to serve as a minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to authorise an address by Douglas Alexander, his close ally and the International Development Secretary, which in part had a tone that could not be interpreted as anything other than a poke at the Administration in Washington. Mr Brown’s personal record is that of an Atlanticist – albeit of a stripe who would be more content working with a Democrat or a liberal Republican than a conservative Republican. A prime minister, though, must cooperate cleverly and coherently with the US president he is dealt.

In fairness to Mr Brown, he is not the only politician to be placing distance between himself and the Oval Office. In the past few months, almost the whole of the Democratic Party in Congress and a number of Republican senators who had previously backed the intervention in Iraq have been “reassessing” their position. Those who opted for more consistency, such as Senator John McCain, have suffered for their integrity. Even George W. Bush has conceded that Americans have become “weary” of the struggle in Iraq and has pleaded for longer to see the strategy through.

The almost tragic irony of the situation is that the strategy in Iraq now, designed by General David Petraeus, is the most plausible to have been implemented in the past four years. As we report today, US units have moved out of their fortified bases in predominantly Sunni areas and embedded themselves with the local population. Combined with a much more thorough effort to win over “hearts and minds”, results have been achieved, if at a high cost in army casualties. Relations between the US forces and the Sunni minority are better now than at any point since Saddam Hussein was deposed. Tribal sheikhs are actively cooperating with the US against al-Qaeda. Atrocities are still occurring in and around Baghdad but not at the dire rate seen before the “surge” was inaugurated.

There is the basis here for a counter-insurgency drive that will deliver not in weeks but not as long as decades either. The US military cannot be expected to maintain a force of this strength engaged in this form of combat indefinitely. It does not need to. It only has to stay until the point where sufficiently large numbers of the Iraqi Army and police units are in place and there is a political settlement in Baghdad that all sides deem acceptable. If the will is there, much of what needs to be accomplished could be realised in several months, not several years.

Iraq timeline: five years of conflict

From accusations that the weapons of mass destruction dossier had been sexed-up to withdrawal of British troops from Basra

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Time and politics, nevertheless, have become the real enemies. General Petraeus is due to submit a report in September. There are many in Washington who are not prepared to wait until his evidence is gathered and assessed. They would prefer that the President announces a substantial withdrawal of troops from Iraq so that the theme does not become the central question in the 2008 elections. There will be some in the British Government who, despite the protestations of the Prime Minister, would also like America to provide the alibi for the majority of British troops to be brought back from Iraq before a possible general election next May.

To do that would endanger the progress made this year. There is much that can be said against the administration of Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, and he certainly has not pursued the measures required to promote national reconciliation with the vigour that should have been expected. He has, despite this, at least ended his appeasement of the rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and indeed is pursuing him and his extremist supporters with commendable determination. If he and other Iraqi leaders have any sense, they will understand that they have to do much more if the patience of voters in the United States (and Britain) is not exhausted. There are reasons for real hope in Iraq. That hope will be lost if the country is prematurely abandoned.