Pakistan’s Minister of Information said on Wednesday that President Musharraf’s abrupt decision not to attend a long-planned grand assembly of Pakistani and Afghan tribal leaders in Kabul was because of the “difficult circumstances” in Pakistan, which, he suggested, could lead to emergency rule. Yesterday, as rumours swept Islamabad, the head of General Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League swiftly played down the suggestion. If the embattled President was flying a kite, the reaction should be an obvious warning. However volatile Pakistan’s political and security situation appears now, a state of emergency would be a political and diplomatic disaster.

His present difficulties are largely self-created. The general’s coup in 1999 was initially welcomed by almost all Pakistanis, angered by corruption, stagnation and the bickering of venal politicians. To the outside world, he also seemed the best hope of stamping out corruption, confronting Islamist extremists and easing the tense stand-off with India. After 9/11 he also became a vital ally of the West, especially of America, in the fight against terrorism and the Taleban. But gradually he has alienated key constituencies, some worth confronting, others which should have been courted. His crackdown on Islamist militants has angered a swath of extremists, from pro-Taleban tribesmen in North West Frontier Province to antiIndian fighters in Kashmir. His failure to settle separatist grievances in Baluchistan and sectarian rivalries in Karachi has left large areas in quasi-rebellion against Islamabad. His anticorruption campaign and prevarication over a return to civilian rule have upset resentful political powerbrokers. And, more recently, his ill-judged dismissal of the Chief Justice and attempt to crack down on the press have caused uproar among the middle class. All have separate grievances, but General Musharraf’s often inept approach has united many in opposition to his rule.

It is, however, his insistence on standing again for office while refusing to step down as head of the army that has brought the present crisis to a head. He bases his legitimacy on a referendum result that was ratified by a Parliament which, thanks to his institution of corruption investigations against opponents, is largely under his control. That Parliament is due to be reelected next month. Before it is dissolved, however, President Musharraf wants it to reelect him for a further term, a decision he wants confirmed by the new Parliament. Despite denials, he has been discussing a deal with Benazir Bhutto, the exiled leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, that would deliver her party’s votes for his presidency.

The sticking point is his refusal to doff his uniform. He clearly has doubts about the loyalty of both the army and the ISI intelligence agency, both of which have been infiltrated by Islamists, and fears (based perhaps on his own example) that any new army head might harbour political ambitions. He argues to his American supporters that Pakistan faces a challenge by extremists, and that he must remain in power to fight them.

He is wrong on all counts. Islamist militants command little popular support: it was not the storming of the Red Mosque that brought crowds on to the street but the dismissal of the Chief Justice. Pakistan needs investment, education and civil society. General Musharraf should resign from the army, appeal to the middle class, seek political compromise and run on his otherwise commendable record. In the absence of any credible political opponent, he might still win.