It was sickeningly inevitable that the Burmese junta would send in armed troops to break up the demonstrations in Rangoon, beat the protesters and arrest some of the monks taking part. The secretive cabal ruling the country is facing the biggest challenge to its power since 1990, when it annulled an opposition election victory and suppressed the subsequent protests with considerable brutality. The generals saw that unless they stopped the momentum of national protest at their benighted rule, they would lose authority, control and power. Ceausescu and Milosevic are two recent examples of the pattern. The announcement of fresh sanctions by Washington and Brussels made clear the West’s hopes that the protests will bring down the junta; no call for restraint by Gordon Brown will inhibit the generals’ determination to take whatever steps are needed to prevent that outcome.

The dilemma for Western governments is how to respond to the crackdown without either adding to the repression or appearing cynically unwilling to commit themselves beyond verbal protest. A first step would be for the West to recognise its comparative lack of leverage; the junta is far more likely to be influenced by its neighbours and trading partners than by Western tourist boycotts and sharp words at party conferences.

Burma’s neighbours do indeed have influence. They have wrestled for years with the problem of how to deal with a suspicious military leadership, and have reached a wary modus operandi. Isolating Burma has, for them, never been a realistic option. All are affected by the flourishing drugs trade in the Golden Triangle. Thailand also has seen an influx of Karen refugees, and has an interest not only in ending their persecution within Burma and stabilising the long shared border, but in combating the criminality, smuggling and corruption that the poverty in Burma has engendered. For a long time the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations kept the junta at arm’s-length; eventually it decided that admitting Burma was a better way of engaging its Government. This has been a stumbling block in Asean’s dialogue with Europe and America; but Burma’s neighbours can use their readiness to include it in their grouping as a way of insisting, in private, on reforms within the country.

Sharper and more insistent words must come from China. Burma’s largest trading partner would be acutely embarrassed by public accusations that it is bankrolling the generals, especially if their crackdown produces bloodshed. The Olympics give the West an unusual chance to shame China into action. No one, though, should expect a public dressing-down. That is not the way of Chinese diplomacy, nor is it likely to produce results in a region where face is all-important. Japan understands this and, like China, is courting Burma for its energy reserves. The Japanese have also historically had a warm sentiment for a country seen as quietly friendly to them. It is a sentiment that should be used to shield the Burmese people from further repression.

Daylight is the greatest enemy of dictatorship. If this crisis is resolved peacefully, engaging Burma will be a crucial part of the country’s rehabilitation. Burmese society is complicated, and exposure to the outside world may be the best way of loosening some of the constraints. The junta may be persuaded more by the prospect of Western investment than the threat of further isolation. Burma’s friends must push hard for freedom for the Burmese people.