President Musharraf's announcement that he would, after all, schedule elections in Pakistan by mid-February, a month after they were due, looked like the first step in a careful retreat from emergency rule. His supporters would claim that the general's intention was never to damage democracy, but only to safeguard its workings by clamping down on extremists. More neutral observers, however, believe that he has been forced into this concession by growing pressure in Washington, especially President Bush's frank telephone call, and the streak of pragmatism that usually succeeds the bluff general's initial hasty and histrionic announcements.

His preoccupation has been how to overcome the hostility of the judiciary to his determination to keep his uniform, while returning the country to a semblance of civilian rule. This is what lies behind his dismissal of the Chief Justice and other judges, as well as the brief house arrest order imposed on Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the opposition Pakistan People's Party. Both were intended to deal with immediate challenges, and General Musharraf has been frank in admitting the link. He said that he would be willing to resign as head of the army when the Supreme Court validated his election as President for another term. And his spokesmen yesterday insisted that Ms Bhutto was detained to prevent her attending a planned rally in Rawalpindi by her supporters, where, they said, suicide bombers might attempt similar attacks to the attacks that killed 140 people on her arrival in Pakistan.

Ms Bhutto was released within hours, but not before making a symbolic attempt to breach the police cordon, accusing the President of paralysing the Government and challenging him to restore the Constitution. In truth, however, her detention suited her political plans as well as those of General Musharraf. She has been careful not to call out her supporters on to the streets. If she had attended the Rawalpindi rally she might have felt under unwelcome pressure to ratchet up her rhetoric, and to call on her supporters to defy the emergency. President Musharraf, for his part, needs to show his supporters that he is still very much in charge and is not allowing Ms Bhutto to dictate political developments.

In their wary circling of each other's positions, both are conscious of the need to respond to internal tensions and external pressure. The danger is that their supporters are far less ready to avoid confrontation. If Ms Bhutto plays the martyr too effectively, her party will feel emboldened to mount a campaign of civil disobedience and join forces with those embittered lawyers who have already turned their backs on compromise. For his part, General Musharraf clearly feels the need to reassure the army, the basis of his power, and has taken some steps that are disquieting. The release of some Islamist militants is probably intended to reduce the opposition in the tribal areas, where pro-Taleban groups have inflicted heavy casualties on the army. But it sends a wrong signal to middle-class opponents of the emergency, who are still being rounded up, and to Washington, whose support for the President is largely determined by his value as an ally in fighting extremism. Both politicians need to work harder to pull Pakistan back from the brink. If not, emergency rule could quickly lead to a real emergency.