Gordon Brown’s visit to southern Iraq yesterday was intended to show his solidarity with British troops and his confidence in the Iraqi administration which is poised to assume ever greater authority in that region. The first of the objectives was reasonable and honourable. British forces have undertaken a difficult mission in extremely challenging terrain and with limited resources.

Whether the Basra that they will leave behind is all that it could have been is far more debatable. As we report today, conditions in that city remain less than ideal. Shia extremists, although they may no longer be taking as many potshots at British soldiers, appear as determined as ever to impose their nasty brand of Islam on others – especially women. The issue is how much Mr Brown’s Government has allowed these trends extra traction by playing to a British domestic gallery rather than addressing the facts on the ground in Iraq. There was, of course, a limit to the extent that Britain could prevent some of this happening. Basra and its surrounding area have long been the heart of Shia Iraq and the sadistic persecution introduced by Saddam Hussein hardened loyalties to that faith and empowered religious leaders as the most powerful alternative to the hated Baathist Party. Iranian influence – overt and covert – has been considerable for some time and the border between the two nations is porous not only for people but ideas. After decades of suppression, it is no surprise that the instinct of a swath of the population is to return to their core teachings and to seek the maximum autonomy from the centre that is practical. That much of Iraq’s oil wealth comes from the region only reinforces these preferences.

Yet, despite these circumstances, the contrast between recent trends in Basra and Baghdad is uncomfortable. In the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam, the British establishment took pleasure in celebrating the comparative peace of its patch as compared with the turmoil which the allegedly unsophisticated American army was struggling to handle in the Iraqi capital and the surrounding “Sunni triangle”. This comparison was explained away at one level by recent UK experience in Northern Ireland or, by the diplomatic grandees, because this country had “done empire” in the Middle East and so appreciated the kind of subtle compromises with the locals that were needed for an outside power to hold sway. This analysis looks far less convincing after the success of the US “surge” this year and the reversion of British military personnel to Basra airport. A more muscular, and smarter, approach pioneered by General David Petraeus has delivered striking dividends. This has certainly not been matched in Basra.

There is, regrettably, precious little time left to change the political dynamics in Basra, but what opportunity exists should still be seized. An unduly hasty withdrawal from the city simply to satisfy short-term popular opinion at home would be undignified and counter-productive. It would further encourage fanatics who are already convinced that Britain is not committed to anything more than “stability” in this part of Iraq, even if it has come by allowing one section of a community to smother all others. What resources remain must be deployed to promote democratic institutions, encourage a free and diverse press and to entrench, as far as it can be done, the liberties of women. The year 2007 has broadly been one of real success in Iraq. It is not evident, alas, that Basra is part of that positive story.