It may be cold in the Hindu Kush at this time of year, but there are plenty of reasons for the Taleban's commanders to be cheerful. They have lost control of Musa Qala, but Hamid Karzai has nonetheless chosen to criticise the British Forces who retook it. Many of the other nations in the coalition backing President Karzai operate according to their own rules to no clearly defined purpose. The biggest coalition member, the United States, has questioned publicly its partners' skill and commitment to fighting the insurgency, and, with better co-ordination of the coalition's efforts critically urgent, the man the UN trusted to deliver it has turned down the job. Opium production, meanwhile, is at a record high.

With Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon no longer in contention, the only certainty about the unenviable post of UN envoy to Afghanistan is who will leave it. The questionable honour goes to Tom Koenigs, a German former diplomat who has failed largely to forge a constructive relationship between Mr Karzai's Government and the bewildering array of foreign military and non-military help available to it. The challenges, he said this month, were to improve regional cooperation with strife-torn Pakistan, strengthen Afghan Forces' weak grip on security, start to assert control of ballooning poppy cultivation and extend government reach into the provinces.

The list could hardly be longer. What stands out, however, is Mr Karzai's continuing and crippling weakness outside Kabul. His response has been to shore up his position by means of pacts with local warlords and tribal leaders rather than reformers in his own image. Many, including Sher Muhammad Akhunzada, a former governor of Helmand removed at Britain's request, are implicated deeply in the drugs trade. Few have serious credentials in the business of governance. Their influence mocks Mr Karzai's claim to be fighting corruption, and poisons his relationship with the coalition fighting the Taleban.

Given the domestic alliances he has forged, it is understandable that Mr Karzai believes he must at all costs avoid being seen as subordinate to an overmighty foreign emissary. His unguarded criticism of British Forces was one result. Another was his unambiguous signal that he could not work with a UN envoy granted the broad powers Lord Ashdown was seeking. The former High Representative to Bosnia may, indeed, have succeeded only in undermining Mr Karzai's position, and the West must accept that there is currently no democratic alternative to the Karzai administration. But whoever goes to Kabul in Lord Ashdown's place will still need real clout. A “super” envoy without the power to hire and fire does not deserve the title, and Afghanistan in particular is crying out for a UN representative with the confidence to speak for the civilian side of Nato as well as the UN.

If General John McColl succeeds Mr Koenigs, as Kabul hopes, his most urgent task will be to demand better co-ordination from the myriad members of Nato's International Security Assistance Force. In April 3,000 more US Marines will head for Afghanistan, but without a more streamlined ISAF command structure they will not be enough to ensure the security on which reconstruction - and Mr Karzai's legitimacy - depends. Asked in Davos if he planned to stand for re-election next year, the beleaguered Afghan leader said he had “miles to go before I sleep”. He has as far to go in rethinking his relationship with his foreign partners. He needs them as much as they need him.