Rarely has a coroner criticised a government department in such scathing terms, or more damningly, and directly blamed dithering in Whitehall for a soldier's death. But the assistant coroner in Oxford, conducting the inquest into the death of Captain James Philippson in Afghanistan in 2006, said yesterday that the failure to supply him with basic equipment was “unforgivable and inexcusable” and constituted a breach of trust by the Ministry of Defence. Captain Philippson was killed by a gunshot wound to the head as his unit went to rescue other British soldiers under fire in Helmand. Had he and his men been properly equipped with Minimi machineguns, rifles with underslung grenades and night-vision goggles, he may not have been shot. The coroner all but accused the Government of sending a man to his death by culpable negligence.

This is a shocking accusation, made all the worse by previous similar incidents. Almost from the day of their secondment to the International Security Assistance Force, British troops lacked the armour routinely provided to other Nato forces. This was bad for morale, bad for security and bad for the operations thus jeopardised. But when units were sent down to the more dangerous provinces in the south, these deficiencies became critical. Britain has taken a large number of casualties already. The reason is not because the Taleban are better soldiers, but because the British forces have been outgunned.

The scandal, however, is that this was long predictable. For more than five years in Iraq, British troops have lacked the equipment given to the Americans. Night-vision goggles can affect the outcome of an encounter decisively, making the difference between survival and death. Yet while every US soldier has a pair, British troops are often sent on patrol without them. Even less excusable is a failure to provide sufficient body armour, and last year an inquest into a sergeant killed in 2003 heard that more than 2,000 British troops were sent into battle without body armour. About 6 per cent of the 37,000 sets ordered had not been dispatched as combat started.

Such ineptness is reminiscent of 1914 or the Crimean War, when officials in London were wholly unaware of ground conditions. Today Whitehall cannot even plead ignorance. Commanders have called for better kit. So frustrated have they been that some have spoken out publicly. The response from pusillanimous MoD officials has been that supplies are on their way. And, indeed, much has been sent out, especially to Afghanistan. But such is the overall shortage that hardly anything is left in Britain: recruits have few general service machineguns to train on and little chance to acquaint themselves with what they will be using in the field.

What is clear from internal documents is that the Labour Government, and in particular Gordon Brown, have consistently underfunded the operations they have ordered. Mr Brown's instinctive disdain for anything military meant that the Treasury, in the July Comprehensive Spending Review, has limited the MoD's real spending growth to 1.5 per cent, a figure far below inflation in equipment costs of at least 8 per cent a year and well under the amount needed to cope with new deployments. In fact, the budgetary position is worse. The Treasury has funded Iraq and Afghanistan from contingency funds, to the tune of £6.6 billion since 2001. It has now changed the rules of “urgent operational requirements” and is seeking to claw back billions of pounds from the MoD, forcing huge new cuts in its already overstretched core budget.

Whitehall insists it is providing everything necessary for both wars. Yesterday Des Browne unveiled a new laser rangefinder for the Army's artillery regiments, which is to be used in Afghanistan - but not for a year. Such promises will hardly assuage the Oxford coroner or Captain Phillipson's family. Instead, the Government must decide urgently that, if Britain is in Afghanistan for the long haul, it has the equipment, capability and funds to carry out the operation. Anything else is culpable negligence.