Inevitably, five years after the invasion of Iraq, there are attempts, especially by those who are, or were, hostile to the allied coalition, to draw up a balance sheet. In many ways it makes for sorry reading. So many opportunities were missed, so much was left to chance. An extraordinary military victory was vitiated by inept occupation policies. Iraq's history, make-up and traditions were ignored, its sufferings and weaknesses played down. A rundown country has been further weakened by a bloody terrorist campaign, an explosion of atavistic hatreds, virtual civil war and the mass exodus of its ablest citizens. As our analyses over the past week have shown, a tyranny has been overthrown - but at a great cost.

Recriminations, however, are a poor basis for future policy. What matters now, especially to Iraq's long-suffering people, is how the country can be helped towards recovery. Already that recovery has begun. Security is incomparably better than it was two years ago. There are fewer sectarian killings and suicide bombings. Al- Qaeda is on the run, as sickened Iraqis turn on the pathological murderers. People are venturing out of their houses and on to the streets. Trade is beginning to recover and exiles are coming home. A government paralysed by wrangling and sectarian suspicion has passed vital long-term legislation. Wrecked infrastructure is slowly being repaired. Oil revenues are at last bringing in the huge sums needed to fund Iraq's rehabilitation.

Three factors will largely determine the next few years: America, Iran and what happens on the ground. There is an expectation that much will change in Iraq itself after the US election. That is wrong. Given the success of the surge, neither Democratic contender nor John McCain, if elected, will order a swift US military withdrawal. To do so would jeopardise all the recent gains. There may be scope for some force reductions; but what Iraq needs is a properly trained and equipped army, a competent police force and an external security guarantor. Some Iraqi brigades are fairly capable but few can yet act on their own. Al-Qaeda still has strongholds that must be smashed. US forces must remain engaged for years - and with them American policymakers.

Iraq cannot recover without the help of its neighbours. The most influential is Iran, a country with a vital security interest but one also with a huge capacity for mischief. Perhaps because, in its hubris, it believes it has triumphed, Iran has played a more responsible role in recent months. Funding and support for terrorism have dwindled. Political engagement has been stepped up. Tehran seems willing even to countenance a tacit security understanding with the Americans. That must be encouraged. But Iran should exercise no hegemony. Iraq's Arab neighbours must end their pusillanimous and self-righteous refusal to intervene, open embassies in Baghdad, engage the various political groups and underpin Iraq's educational and cultural links with the Muslim world broken by Saddam's misrule.

Most importantly, however, Iraqis themselves must press their bickering Government to make those compromises essential to hold the country together. This means dividing oil revenues fairly, institutionalising regional autonomy, curbing tribal factionalism and sectarian militias, expanding trade and overcoming the tradition of vendetta politics. Real democracy may be a long way off. But with a framework for co-existence, tolerance and enterprise at home, and recovery sustained abroad, Iraq has, at last, a chance.