In any previous general election, the abrupt — though hardly unexpected — collapse of Britain’s largest, indeed only, home-owned car manufacturer in the first week of the campaign would have been devastating for the Government. The trade unions would have been in uproar. The Opposition would have seized on the issue to hammer the Government’s economic and industrial record. Ministers would have belatedly announced an expensive rescue package. Brussels would have imposed a veto. The car company would still have collapsed.

The decision by Rover to call in the receivers was indeed described by Patricia Hewitt, the Industry Minister, as “devastating”. But in fact the damage, economic and political, may be relatively contained. For a start, few people are blaming the Government. It was clear that Tony Blair expended time and political capital lobbying with the Chinese Government. Gordon Brown took up the theme in face-to-face talks in China. A generous bridging loan of £100 million was offered, although there was only meaning in it if it were a bridge to somewhere. The trade unions know this, and so does the Opposition. Neither could call for the kind of direct intervention that so spectacularly failed to rescue ailing companies in the past.

Indeed, the presence of a trade union leader beside Ms Hewitt underlined the pragmatic determination of both sides to focus, instead, on what could be done to mitigate the harsh blow to the 6,000 workers at Longbridge and the effects on the local economy. This, also, may be less serious than previous large industrial collapses. First, the economy generally is robust, and there will be demand for the skills of the Longbridge workforce. Secondly, Rover has been visibly ailing for years; its relaunch in 2001 did little more than postpone the inevitable. This gave many employees time to look around for other jobs. And it allowed some of the components manufacturers to diversify into other areas and other brands. Thirdly, a new realism underlines industrial policy on all sides. There is an acceptance even by the trade unions that volume manufacturing is moving abroad and that Britain’s future lies more in high-skills, specialist production and services.

In the midst of a campaign, however, there will inevitably be a search for blame. Some can rightly be attributed to the overregulated and restrictive manufacturing climate that Labour has created. But most should be laid at the door of those who insisted, against expert advice, on attempting to continue mass production instead of focusing on the potential of MG. And the greatest criticism must go to the executives who failed the company and its workers, but who seemed still to have managed to line their own pockets.