The combat in Fallujah is, as we report today, intense and the ultimate outcome cannot be certain. James Hider’s personal account offers a sense of the conflict between coalition troops on the one hand and a hardened collection of insurgents, extremists and terrorists on the other. In so far as a judgment can be reached, US and Iraqi soldiers have made better initial progress than might have been expected and much of the city is now under their command. The situation is, however, unpredictable and no one in Baghdad or Washington will be declaring outright victory for some time to come.

Such caution is wise. The conditions in which the battle is being waged are different from any fighting that either the US or its Iraqi allies have experienced since the Kuwaiti border was crossed almost 20 months ago. Similar offensives have proved inconclusive as insurgents have exploited the smoke and the confusion to spirit themselves away. US commanders cannot afford to let that happen again. That result would allow extremists to claim a political victory despite suffering a heavy military defeat, and to continue their random acts of extreme violence.

The American preparations for this assault have been thorough. The US Army, aware of the danger of civilian deaths, has encouraged ordinary people to leave Fallujah, while the Iraqi interim Government has attempted repeatedly to convince those who hold arms to lay them down and to disperse.This is not a struggle that, contrary to how it has been presented in some quarters, the Americans were very gung-ho about. It has, nonetheless, become evident that those either loyal to the old Baathist order or keen volunteers for Islamist terrorism would not cease to use the city as the centre of their operations.

In this context, the US military had to act decisively or fail those entitled to its protection. It would have been profoundly wrong to allow the multiple and co-ordinated killings of those willing to serve in the Iraqi Army, the National Guard and police force to continue to be masterminded by the likes of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Nor would it be possible for the first round of elections planned for January to be successful, as it is important that they indeed are, if potential voters were intimidated from coming to the polls.

The challenges that are presented by urban warfare, not least hidden roadside bombs, have been anticipated and new technology employed to limit the damage. It is, though, impossible to outwit all possible attacks and both the United States and Iraqi forces will sustain casualties. The dangers that they face reinforces the need for other units, such as The Black Watch, to provide crucial logistical support elsewhere in the country.

Fallujah is not the only rebel stronghold. There are other places where law and order is far from ideal. But Fallujah has become a symbol of a wider contest. If the United States is seen to have won on the ground in military terms and the authorities in Baghdad are perceived to have regained political control outside the capital, Iraqis will feel far more secure.

The most important objective now is to ensure that as much of Iraq as possible is in a state where free and fair elections can be completed next year and full power handed to the representatives of the people. The fight for Fallujah will largely, but not exclusively, determine whether that entirely noble aim can be realised.