Cutting the strength of the French Army by 24 per cent seems, on first sight, an odd way of modernising France's armed forces when Afghanistan and the demands of peacekeeping are straining the military capabilities of most Nato members. But President Sarkozy's ambitious proposals (see page 38), outlined to 3,000 officers yesterday in the first major review of military strategy in 14 years, are as sensible as they are far-reaching.

The military aim is to make the French Army leaner, supplied with better intelligence and modern weaponry and more focused on today's terrorist threats rather than the Cold War danger of conflict in Europe. But there is also a significant shift in defence doctrine. France is reconfiguring its armed forces with the intention of rejoining Nato's unified military command and boosting the European Union's role in defence. More than 40 years after France gave Nato notice to quit Paris, Mr Sarkozy has told his allies and his countrymen that the Gaullist dream of military independence is over.

Many of the changes have been forced on France by a lack of money. When one in every two civil servants is not being replaced, the retirement age is to be raised and social security budgets are being cut, Mr Sarkozy has made it clear that France's armed forces must live within their means. But he has also exploited necessity to his advantage. France still has one of the largest professional armies in Europe. Even with the ending of conscription in 1996, it still has some 270,000 troops in the army, navy and air force. The proposed cuts will reduce military and civilian jobs by 54,000, leaving an army of about 88,000 deployable troops. The savings will be used to double spending on satellite technology to £552 million a year, to put in place a missile detection system, develop cruise missiles and spend more on procurement and intelligence. Defence spending will be held at 2.3 per cent of national income (just below Britain's 2.4 per cent) until 2012 but then it will rise by one percentage point ahead of inflation until 2014.

There will be a political cost. At home, Mr Sarkozy can expect fierce opposition to proposals to close some 50 military bases, garrisons and other defence facilities. Overseas, and especially in Africa, there may be worries that France will be less willing to send troops to the aid of governments in former colonies that run into trouble, and some of France's four permanent bases in Africa will be shut. That, too, will mark a decisive break with Gaullist policy - one that the Socialists, ironically, are preparing to denounce but a change that is in keeping with Mr Sarkozy's call for a rupture in old attitudes.

There will also be some Gaullist regret at Mr Sarkozy's determination to put France back into Nato's military structure. He has insisted that France will retain control of its nuclear deterrent; but he knows that the pretence of a defence policy independent of - and sometimes deliberately provocative to - the Americans and other allies is vainglorious folly. Nevertheless, he has signalled one area where there may be trouble: the attempt to give the EU a bigger defence role. There is a role here, but one that must be dovetailed with Nato. If he is willing to do that, France's Nato allies will wish him well in his plans to enforce military realism and a new strategic vision.