The war itself was short, the civilian casualties relatively light, given the scale of the operation, and the damage to Iraq’s crumbling infrastructure was hardly irreparable. “Regime change” was demonstrably as popular among Iraqis as Washington had contended; their rejoicing at Saddam Hussein’s downfall was unfeigned. No nation welcomes foreign occupation, but most Iraqis understood it to be a necessary aspect of their nation’s political transformation. Decades of mismanagement, coupled with the effects of international sanctions, had left the economy a shambles, but oil, a large, skilled middle class and the certainty of generous international aid were expected to put Iraq quite rapidly on a fast track to recovery. Although the need for a sustained foreign military presence was always evident, it thus seemed reasonable a year ago to expect a fairly smooth transfer of sovereignty and administrative responsibility to Iraqis by the summer of 2004.

Today, with less than six weeks before the handover, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy, is having trouble finding people who are both reliable and willing to court the risks of being part of the interim Iraqi administration. Where power has shifted to Iraqis, it has been in the unwelcome guise of armed militias, some fighting coalition forces, others engaged in local power struggles.

However bitterly Iraqis detest the soldiers who have turned their streets into battlegrounds, the violence that citizens endure has done much to turn them against the coalition in anger and contempt. Spread too thinly, the occupying forces were increasingly seen by Iraqis to be failing in their duty to protect. And then, inflicting huge and lasting damage on the credibility of all America’s brave and genuine pledges about bringing democracy and the rule of law to Iraq, came the revelation of the grotesque abuses at Abu Ghraib. Governing Iraq, for Iraqis as well as coalition authorities, has become a white-knuckle ride. The perception that this whole venture has been a catalogue of error is now widespread in the US and Britain, where support was originally most robust.

Grave mistakes there have certainly been, beginning with the decision to deploy a smaller force than necessary to secure the peace, and the crucial early failure to appreciate how complete was the collapse of authority, and how urgent the need to establish effective control and to use what potential sources of order — including the regular Iraqi Armed Forces — could be ordered into service. The training of Iraq’s police and reformed army is still behind schedule, and the penny-pinching failure to equip them properly has exposed them to unnecessary peril. These early failures did much to hinder an ambitious programme of social, political and economic development, and to demoralise the many courageous Iraqis committed to making it work.

That commitment has not, however, evaporated and could yet gather strength. That is why the transfer of power must go ahead when planned — but also by stages, as planned: security in Iraq must improve before elections can be other than a bloodstained fiasco. So long as Iraqis can be persuaded that they will end up being ruled by a government that has their consent, they will be prepared to wait. Abu Ghraib has made that task far more difficult; provided there is an American effort to win back hearts and minds, not least by generous resettlement packages for those it is releasing from Iraqi jails, it is not impossible.

But none of this will help without equally firm resolve, in the White House and Downing Street, to stay the course, with such extra troops as are necessary and for as long as necessary, and backing for that resolve across the political spectrum. Michael Howard’s cheap shots at the US this week were not a useful contribution to the debate.

The Iraq operation began by raising expectations too high. Frustration during this difficult phase is inevitable, but frustration is not a policy. No battle plan ever survived the field of battle and peacebuilding is as hard to plan for. This was never going to be a job easily accomplished in a few weeks. The need now is for candour and humility to understand the extent of the problems; pragmatism to change what needs changing; and courage to stay the course.