The events of the past month have been difficult for the US. Senior officials in Washington were, understandably, stunned by the emergence of the scandal involving the treatment of inmates at Abu Ghraib prison, astonished by the details of the abuse as they became apparent and uncertain how best to respond. This self-inflicted wound could not have come at a more awkward time, coinciding with the final weeks before the transfer of power to an interim Iraqi authority. These circumstances continue to be exploited by a combination of Baathist renegades, Shia extremists and Islamist terrorists; the car bomb attack in Baghdad on Saturday being typical of their activities. The White House has come to appreciate that it must set out more clearly its political strategy for Iraq.

That process will begin again with a major speech by George W. Bush tonight at the US Army War College. It will be the first of six addresses to be delivered by the President over the next five weeks. Mr Bush must make plain his immediate priorities. These are to set out how Iraq will move in phases towards a democratic constitutional settlement, to secure a further UN Security Council resolution endorsing these arrangements and to complete discussions over the shape of the incoming Iraqi government. If presented effectively, such an approach should reassure Iraqis about their future, convince those nations that have troops in that country to keep them in place and persuade both domestic and international opinion that the right course is being taken.

This will be a difficult but not impossible challenge. There are three natural stages in Iraq’s development. The first will be completed on June 30. The next will stretch from then until the first batch of national elections in Iraq in January 2005. The final leg will last until full elections are held for a new Iraqi legislature. It is logical that coalition policy should evolve in tandem with these milestones. A new UN resolution would be useful, but it should be flexible and practical. France’s preference for including a specific date for the withdrawal of all external soldiers would create a needlessly rigid timetable. It is also sensible that American (and British) forces remain under the jurisdictions of their own military codes and international treaties. The bargaining for slots in the next Iraqi cabinet will inevitably be intense and it will involve some brinkmanship, but it can be resolved.

There will not be much in Mr Bush’s text, if anything, that will be disputed in Downing Street. As the moment for restoring sovereignty to Iraq draws near, diplomacy assumes centre stage along with security considerations. If there have been distinctions between American and British philosophy in Iraq, then they are now likely to blur. It is ironic that there should be calls for Tony Blair to distance himself publicly from Mr Bush at the very time when it is evident that the US position has, for pragmatic reasons, moved to territory with which it can be assumed that the Prime Minister is more comfortable. Washington has never been as doctrinaire as its critics contend. The notion that Mr Blair is incapable of making an effective private case to Mr Bush is wrong.

The series of speeches should allow the President to focus on the Middle East in the medium term as well as on the short-term drive to put Iraq on a stable footing. His desire to promote the spread of democracy in the region, eloquently expressed in his lecture in London last November, needs to be revisited. The disturbing failings at Abu Ghraib, awful as they are, hardly undermine the merit of multiparty elections, free speech and economic prosperity. Mr Bush now has another chance to advance these causes, and a restive audience should take the time to listen.