Professor Sir Roy Meadow told the General Medical Council (GMC) yesterday that he had been “as uncomfortable” in court giving expert evidence as a lawyer would be in hospital. Some may wish he had stayed in the hospital and away from the cot death cases that jailed women like Sally Clark. Others may wonder how he could have proved such a persuasive and confident performer in the witness box. Many will feel that his words reflect the deep flaws in the way that expert witnesses are used by courts which have come to rely heavily upon them.

The charge of gross professional misconduct that the GMC is considering relates only to the evidence that Roy Meadow gave in the very complex and still disturbing Sally Clark case. His statement, that the chance of Mrs Clark’s two sons dying was comparable to four different horses winning four successive Grand Nationals at odds of 80-1, was not only grossly misleading but in poor taste. His testimony, in this as in other cases, went far beyond both his own expertise and medical knowledge. It was pure opinion, but presented and treated as fact.

In a sharply worded defence today, The Lancet states that Roy Meadow should not be made a “scapegoat”. It is true that he is not the only medical professional to have made mistakes. Alan Williams, the pathologist in the Sally Clark trial, has rightly been struck off by the GMC for botching the post-mortem examinations and failing to disclose evidence that suggested that her second son died of an infection. That is indeed a greater crime than Roy Meadow is accused of in the Sally Clark case, but it does not exonerate him.

The Lancet maintains that Roy Meadow’s “capitulation to lawyerly pressure and his use of imaginative language were made in good faith”. But there lies the nub of the problem. Expert witnesses should not be put in a position where they are pressured to notch up successful convictions and use colourful language to stick in a jury’s mind. But although in theory their duty is to the court, in practice they are paid by the lawyers representing one side. They have become, essentially opinions for hire.

As long as we continue to be ignorant of the reasons for so many child deaths, courts will be faced with complicated and often conflicting medical evidence. The Clark case is only one of many in which there was so much uncertainty that there must always have been a reasonable doubt. It is hard to escape the impression that in some child abuse cases, the British tradition of innocent until proven guilty has been reversed. An unhealthy, self-reinforcing cycle seems to be at work in which solicitors seek convincing witnesses, and judges become overly reliant on individual experts. That is bad for justice and for public confidence.

It is time to examine the whole process of the use of experts by the courts. To pursue Roy Meadow alone would be to miss the point. The Lancet suggests that the Government create a Royal Commission: at the very least, a formal review is necessary.