George W. Bush noted last week that the process of framing the American Constitution had been controversial, lengthy and taxing, and that the same was proving so for the founding fathers of the new Iraq. The worlds of 1787 and 2005 are completely different in many respects, but in one sense the comparison remains legitimate. There were numerous small disputes about the proposed US Constitution, but the principal area of disagreement related to the precise meaning of the phrase “federalism ”. What was true in Philadelphia almost 220 years ago has been repeated in Baghdad. Which explains why, at this stage, it has not been possible to reach a universal consensus.

The constitutional text presented to the Iraqi parliament yesterday is still a remarkable document in a number of respects. It has been not just accepted but sincerely welcomed by delegates from the Shia and Kurdish communities. An understanding between these two groups, which differ in more than ethnicity, was certainly not a foregone conclusion. Saddam Hussein’s sadistic and calculated strategy of “divide and rule” had produced a legacy of rivalry between these camps that could have led to a total constitutional impasse. This did not occur and, furthermore, both of these sides have tried, right up to the last minute, to offer concessions that would satisfy the Sunnis.

In many areas, serious progress has been recorded. What could have been a bitter fight over the relationship between religion and the state has been eased by a form of words asserting Iraq’s Islamic heritage and identity but making it plain that democratic principles and human rights are values that cannot be discarded in the name of theology. Another compromise was crafted to allay fears that rooting out the remnants of the old Baath Party elite will not be an excuse to minimise the influence of Sunnis in general.

The federalism question has been a much, much harder nut to crack. It is entirely understandable that after the decades of ultra-centralised Baathist rule that Shias and Kurds alike want a comparatively loose federation for the future. Most Sunni leaders not only acknowledge this, but also have some sympathy with it. The difficulty is that most of Iraq’s oil and gas, and thus its wealth, are located in parts of Iraq where either the Shia or the Kurds, but not Sunnis, are predominant. The legitimate fear of the Sunnis, therefore, is that in an ultra-federal Iraq, these assets will fall to the provinces and not the nation. If that occurred, the economic status of Sunnis would be badly diminished.

It is in the interests of all three sections of Iraq to strike a deal on this in advance of the referendum on the constitution, which is due to take place in October. The constitution will fall if two-thirds of the electorate in three or more provinces reject it, even if a clear overall majority favours the text. The Sunni population is large enough in four of these provinces to represent a credible threat to the constitution. The Shia and Kurdish leaderships will not want to risk a defeat in this ballot.

To avoid that fate, they should have the courage and candour to admit that this is a row about money disguised as a debate on high constitutional theory. They should present the Sunnis, separately from the main document if necessary, with a guarantee about how oil and gas revenues will be handed out that reasonable people can accept. It is not too late to secure an arrangement that is acceptable to the vast bulk of Iraqis. It is vital that the effort is made.