The Security Council’s response to North Korea’s claimed nuclear test is tougher and more far-reaching than Kim Jong Il probably expected. If the North Korean dictator calculated that Chinese and South Korean reluctance to squeeze his unpredictable regime too hard would, after international grumbling, give him a pass into the nuclear club, he has been disabused.

China, Deeply angered, agreed to take action under Chapter VII, the enforcement segment of the UN Charter invoked only against threats to international peace and security. Compliance is obligatory. North Korea has been told to play ball and the standards against which it will be judged will go well beyond ending its nuclear testing.

Resolution 1718 declares unequivocally that North Korea “shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes”, its ballistic missile programme and “other weapons of mass destruction” — a reference to the regime’s chemical and biological weapons capability. Pyongyang has been told to retract its 2003 decision to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea must return to the safeguards regime policed by the International Atomic Energy Agency and also give the IAEA full access to everything that it needs to verify the country’s nuclear disarmament. It must suspend its development of ballistic missiles and end missile tests.

The resolution bans the sale or purchase of North Korean weaponry and military technology. It thus obliges all states to prevent the sale or transfer to North Korea of heavy weapons and spares, and all equipment and know-how that could assist its outlawed weapons programmes, to freeze all North Korean assets related to these programmes and to deny entry to all North Koreans — and their families — suspected of involvement in such activities. A final ban, on North Korea’ s luxury imports, is far from being merely symbolic. The aim is not only to deprive the “Dear Leader” of foie gras, but to dry up the flow of otherwise unobtainable goods that buy the loyalty of key figures in the regime.

Two questions arise. The first is enforcement. The resolution calls on all states to inspect all North Korean cargo, a provision that would enable the 70 nations that co-operate in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict illicit shipments. On China’s insistence, however, this is not mandatory and Beijing’s participation is essential. The second is whether sanctions alone can bring this regime into line. China, with Russia, insisted on using Article 41 of the UN Charter, which stops short of military action.

These restriction aside, the onus remains on China to use its influence, not with Mr Kim, whose only interest is in remaining in power, but with those senior officers and officials in North Korea who are painfully aware of the humiliation of millions of people in the pursuit of the most vacuous of personality cults. The Dear Leader is not just a threat to his own people, but to China and all in the vicinity. The past week has been a turning point, not just for Pyongyang, but, more importantly, for Beijing.