The meeting between George W. Bush and Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, in Amman yesterday had a clear-the-air feel to it. That is appropriate. Both men acknowledged the scale of the difficulties that Iraq faces and hinted that a change in strategy will be implemented shortly.

And changes there must certainly be if the sectarian violence in Baghdad is to be subdued and prevented from spreading to more peaceable provinces. This is not necessarily a question of grand strategy, let alone troop ceilings or politically driven timetables. In Iraq’s tense condition, dramatic moves could do grave harm. Politically, for instance, it makes more sense for Iraq to talk to Iran and Syria, as Mr al-Maliki has been doing, than for the US to wade in on its behalf, Militarily, as General John Abizaid forcefully argued before Congress last month, the primary need is operational flexibility.

It remains evident that military and policing tactics, originally designed to defeat terrorist attacks and Baathist insurgents, need to be rethought in the context of the spiralling violence. The Pentagon has been doing more of that rethinking than the Administration’s many critics, at home and abroad, are inclined to admit. US forces have stepped up efforts to train the Iraqi military, and to monitor them in action by increasing the number of advisory teams em- bedded in Iraqi units.

That is a better use of US manpower than the earlier emphasis on keeping troops in giant barracks, and given the task of reinforcing Iraqi contingents when necessary.

This effort is, however, being undermined by political corruption, which results in Iraqi recruits being bilked of pay and much essential equipment — and, dangerously, in the tendency of unpaid soldiers to survive by selling uniforms, guns and ammunition on the black market. An increasingly severe problem is that many Iraqi soldiers distrust others serving in the same unit, and distrust their Government even more.

That is not surprising. With honourable exceptions, Iraqi politicians have tragically failed their voters, almost totally neglecting the business of government while pursuing sectarian agendas that discredit all parties and turn democracy into a bitter joke. The resort by some ministries to “subcontracting” militias has earned the hatred and contempt of Iraqis whose lives have been shattered by sectarian kidnappings, death squads and criminal rackets. Reconciliation among the factions is literally a matter of life and death.

The urgent and by now desperately difficult task is to persuade Iraqis to trust central author- ity, weak and venal though it be, more than they do the sectarian militias whose “protection” perpetuates the culture of revenge. The delicate question here is whether Mr al-Maliki, who rails publicly at faction leaders for derailing his efforts at national conciliation, is prepared to be tough enough with his fellow Shias to convince Sunnis that his condemnations are more than rhetorical.

In this context, the decision to invite representatives of Baathist exiles to Amman makes sense. The voice of prominent Sunni Iraqis could help to convince Arab governments to stop treating Iraq’s turmoil as a spectator sport. The US has asked the Saudis to join an Arab summit on Iraq, and the Arab League is at last making more positive noises. This initiative must be built on. If Iraq’s neighbours believe that they will prosper in the longer term from chaos now, they are making a mistake that is more serious than any single error made by Washington.