President Musharraf is an adroit politician. His proposal in a television interview to drop Pakistan’s call for an independent Kashmir and his readiness to accept a settlement that would give the disputed territory a large measure of autonomy is a significant concession. It is not wholly new, as he has floated similar ideas before. But it is addressed specifically to an Indian audience and comes just before the visit to Islamabad by the Indian Foreign Minister next month and the likely visit later of Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister. General Musharraf is sending a clear signal to Delhi that he wants to press ahead with a slow-moving peace process, and is ready to take initiatives.

The proposal he put forward on Indian television is similar to what is known in the region as the “Andorra solution”. This would leave the disputed territory with a large measure of self-government, but without full independent sovereignty. Both its neighbours would have a guaranteed right to a say in its affairs — as France and Spain have in Andorra — and each would renounce its claim to sole control, the sticking point in more than half a century of protracted and largely fruitless talks.

The proposal would not give either side what it wants. It follows an earlier significant Pakistani concession in 2003 to drop its longstanding demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, supervised by the United Nations. India welcomed this as a sensible acknowledgment that things had moved on since 1947, and that Pakistan’s core demand was no longer relevant. Unfortunately, this was not matched by any significant change in India’s negotiating position. It maintained its reasonable demands that Pakistan step up efforts to halt cross-border infiltration, crack down on extremist parties supporting terror groups in Kashmir and normalise relations in other fields. But it made no offer to withdraw troops, offer Kashmir greater autonomy or give greater weight to talks with local Hurriyat Conference separatists.

India is in danger of misreading President Musharraf’s position. It worries that the entire peace process depends so largely on one man, and that all talks could be ended by an assassin’s bullet. But it refuses to see how great a risk he is taking in making any concession on Kashmir, an issue fundamental to Pakistan’s conception of itself and its Muslim identity. Pakistan has been wrong in many of its arguments, but it takes a brave man to a make a realistic adjustment to policy in the face of public opinion, especially if he is trying to curb support simultaneously for the Taleban and for Kashmir “freedom fighters”.

India needs to look for policy announcements on Kashmir that would give General Musharraf evidence of negotiating success to show his opponents. Unfortunately, Delhi seems in little hurry to do so. It has been content simply to pocket the concessions and stick to its line. Delhi believes that its growing world strength and close relations with Washington allow it to hang tough, and says it has done enough by keeping talks going despite evidence of Pakistani involvement in the Bombay bombings. Diplomats may understand the need for reciprocity; India’s politicians, facing elections next year and with a nationalist BJP Opposition ready to attack any concession, feel too weak to do so. They are in danger of missing an historic opportunity for a breakthrough.