The violence that erupted in Urumqi over the weekend is the most deadly seen in China’s vast and turbulent north west for years. At least 156 people are reported dead and a further 828 have been injured. The figures were announced by Chinese official media only 12 hours after website reports of rioting and clashes between police and Uighur demonstrators. The details remain murky, but the real figure is likely to be far higher — making this not only the most serious violence in China for the past 20 years but the second uprising against the Beijing authorities in an inland province in 18 months.

Like the violence that broke out in Tibet before the Olympics, the clashes in the capital of Xinjiang province began as a local protest, apparently over the handling of an incident in a factory in southern China last month when two Uighurs were killed in a fight with Han Chinese. As in Tibet, things quickly intensified as police respon- ded with beatings and bullets, and furious Uighurs turned on Han targets. In both provinces, the violence was the cumulation of local resentment at the massive inflow of Han, the anger that Turkic Muslim Uighurs feel at the treatment of Islam and the slights that the Uighurs say that they receive at the hands of the Chinese.

The clashes come at a sensitive time, as did those in Tibet. China is preparing massive celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the Communists’ victory in 1949. The party wants to portray a country that is rich, contented and united under its leadership. The uprisings in Tibet and Xianjiang paint a very different picture — one of imperial rule over minorities who resent the loss of their cultures, freedoms and ability to determine their future. China’s response in each case has been to crack down, reinforce its police and military presence, cut phone and communication links, arrest anyone suspected of separatist sympathies and blame exiles and outside forces for orchestrating the riots — either the Dalai Lama or Rebiya Kadeer, head of the World Uighur Congress who lives in America.

Deep in the bureaucracy there may be those arguing that the assuaging of grievances would better pacify these vast regions. Their voice is not being heard. But the repressive State is finding it harder to assert its authority while encouraging an open economy. A growing difficulty is control of information. Chinese media, though under close party control, have now to operate in real time, where they must compete with other news sources and report accurately if they are to retain any credibility. Xinhua, the official news agency, already showed during the Sechuan earthquake that it put speed and full reporting above spin and time-consuming authorisation. The Chinese instinct to kill the messenger by cutting mobile phones, censoring the internet and dismantling social networks runs up against a pragmatism that understands what technology can do and has seen the futility of similar efforts in Iran.

The Urumqi riots also call into question Han nationalism, increasingly China’s ideological glue as communism loses its fervour. This platform, appealing to more than 90 per cent of the population, seeks to convince all Chinese that they are one ethnic family and represses any minority dissent. Its flaw is that it denies China’s cultural and human diversity and blinds Beijing to rights that it should admit. Money is no panacea: that the authorities have to focus on these minority resentments, rather than the army of unemployed migrants, should send Beijing a message about where policy is failing. The Uighurs may not be challenging Communist control as much as they are Han hegemony. The riots in Urumqi should force a change. Instead, the likely outcome is denial, repression and a step farther away from basic rights and greater self-expression.