The Russian cut-off of gas supplies to Ukraine may prove, in the long run, as catastrophic to the Kremlin as the oil boycott in 1973 eventually proved to the Arabs. Whatever the bland public communiqué by the European Union at its emergency meeting tomorrow, urging Moscow and Kiev to settle their quarrel, the lesson for Europe is clear: the Kremlin’s assurances of stable energy supplies are hostage to its political interests. Europe’s energy lifelines must never depend on Russia.

The political conclusion is almost as bleak. President Putin, having backed the wrong horse in Ukraine’s presidential election last year, is determined to avenge himself on the Orange Revolutionaries. The decision to quadruple the price paid for Russian gas is clearly political and intended to hurt. It is taken in response to the Yushchenko Government’s decision, deeply resented in Moscow, to position itself closer to Nato and the European Union. It is, if not economic blackmail, at least an unacceptable use, in the name of market economics, of a dominant market position.

That such a clumsy action should mark Russia’s assumption of the G8 presidency is a poor riposte to Western critics who maintain that President Putin is, in any case, unqualified to host — for the first time — the annual summit because of his poor democratic record. His clampdown on non-governmental organisations is only the latest in a series of restrictions that have caused the resignation of a top Kremlin economic adviser, with the reproach that Russia was no longer politically or economically free. The irony of the action against Kiev is that Mr Putin wants to make energy security the leitmotif of the summer summit. How could he better demonstrate how a contract can be abused or a country undermined by the manipulation of its energy supplies?

Ukraine, however, has scarcely helped to defuse the quarrel. The appointment last year as Prime Minister of Yulia Tymoshenko, a woman viscerally anti-Russian in her policies, was as provocative as it subsequently proved divisive and sabotaged the talks with Moscow on a new gas contract. Her sacking, amid charges of corruption, signalled the end of the Orange Revolution’s honeymoon and with it hopes that President Yushchenko would be able to overcome inherited problems of corruption and opportunism.

Ukraine has, therefore, had little incentive to make concessions. Indeed, the gas row was seen as the best way of demonstrating to Western Europe Russia’s attempts to put pressure on its neighbour, while uniting a fractious country behind a Government determined to stand up to Russian bullying. If, however, Ukraine is proposing to siphon off gas intended for Western Europe in compensation for transit charges or to supplement a sudden shortfall in the depth of winter — or, indeed, if it has already done so, as Russia alleges — this will quickly lose it friends in the West.

President Putin offered a last-minute compromise, proposing a freeze in price for the next quarter. Ukraine turned this down. Parliamentary elections are due in March: little would so galvanise Mr Yushchenko’s supporters than a stand-off with Moscow. But little could be more dangerous to the rest of Europe. Ukraine may get through this winter. But the opening of a new Cold War shows that pipelines are the new weapons of choice for an embattled and angry Kremlin.