Sir, In addition to security concerns about nuclear labs (report, June 26), similar risks are associated with microbiological laboratories.

The autumn 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, which many attribute to domestic bioterrorism, are not the only indication that biosecurity standards may not be up to scratch.

In May, 2002, the US Agriculture Department’s inspector general found that many of the department’s 124 research laboratories were vulnerable to theft and could not account accurately for their stocks of animal and plant pathogens. And the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases found chronic problems with laboratory security during the 1980s and 1990s, including repeated failures to account for samples of pathogens because of poor internal controls and record-keeping.

When you add in the international dimension, ie, poor security in over 50 biological weapons complexes in the former Soviet Union and lax regulations governing culture collections worldwide, the potential danger looms large.

Owing to the unique nature of biological pathogens, it is a problem that is going to require a new approach (including increased investment in co-operative threat-reduction measures and development of new international biosecurity standards) in order to prevent bioterrorism in the future.

Yours faithfully,
DAVID ISENBERG
(Senior analyst),
British American Security Information Council,
1012 14th Street NW, Suite 900,
Washington, DC 20005.
disenberg@basicint.org
July 2.

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