Sir, In response to David Miliband’s article (Opinion, Aug 19), it is increasingly apparent that the West must treat the conflict between Russia and Georgia as an opportunity to help to resolve the problems of the Caucasus as a whole.

Georgia’s democratic credentials have been tarnished by its actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Russia’s brazen hypocrisy over its approach to independence movements is clear for all to see. Yet it is obvious that a democratic and peaceful resolution to the conflict must recognise the right of South Ossetians and the Abkhaz to have a say in their own governance. If they choose to hold a referendum over joining the Russian Federation, then that is also their right.

However, by the same logic, Russia must be told in no uncertain terms that it cannot pick and choose when to apply these principles. It must be made clear that accepting the right of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to hold a referendum is contingent on extending the same right to Chechnya, following the precedent that was set in Kosovo. Such a result would bring some long-awaited peace and stability to the Caucasus and a positive outcome for all involved.

Ivar Amundsen

Director, Chechnya Peace Forum

Sir, The Foreign Secretary says: “You don’t need to be a student of the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 to find the sight of Russian tanks rolling into a neighbouring country chilling.”

His emotive comparison overlooks the inconvenient fact that Czechoslovakia would like to have escaped Russia’s orbit in 1968, whereas today South Ossetia and Abkhazia are trying to join it. If he were willing to yield to such popular separatist ambitions, as when supporting Kosovo’s departure from Serbia after a 78-day Nato bombardment not authorised by the United Nations (or even involving the defence of a Nato member), Moscow could not now accuse the West of double standards.

This is just the latest episode in a longstanding struggle between Russia and Nato for control of oil and gas supply routes out of the Caspian and into Western Europe. Which local separatist groups they each favour is largely driven by that, as in the Balkans and Chechnya. This dangerous contest is likely to continue until Mr Miliband’s Cabinet and EU colleagues implement a coherent and sustainable energy policy which is not dependent on the carbon-based fuels they claim to be relinquishing in order to mitigate climate change.

Mark Griffiths

Winchester

Sir, Assuming that Nato has no intention of invading Russia, its policy of eastwards expansion makes little strategic sense. The inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in Nato will not enhance its operations in Afghanistan but clearly has provoked, or at least given an excuse to, Russia to ensure that it has a buffer zone on its southern flank.

As Russia’s GDP is less than a 25th of that of the combined Nato members it will struggle to keep up with Nato’s defence spending and, given Russia’s weak demographics and exposed borders as well as the imminent deployment of US anti-ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe, it presents no real and present danger to Nato members anyway.

As Nato isn’t keen to send troops to Georgia and is generally softening its line, Russia is unlikely to invade Ukraine. However, continuing pressure from Nato will lead to more diverse and subtle Russian retaliation, through meddling in the Middle East peace process and Ukraine’s domestic politics, attempting to disrupt Nato operations in Afghanistan, lending support to Iran, continuing to pressure Western companies operating in the former Soviet Union, and incrementally increasing gas prices for European consumers.

Nato has to make up its mind if it is a defence alliance, a political talking shop, a peacekeeping force or simply a stalking horse for US foreign policy.

Nick Day

CEO, Diligence Inc

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