Sir, Having spent most of my working life involved with the airworthiness of many types of military aircraft, I read the detailed and forensic report into the loss of Nimrod XV230 with great interest and deep concern (report, Oct 29). There are serious aspects of the report that should concern the public who ought to demand thoroughgoing changes to restore faith in the airworthiness of our military aircraft.

The age of our Nimrod fleet is not unusual for a military aircraft. Our defence budget only allows us to replace aircraft fleets every 30 years or so, and usually heavier aircraft remain in service for longer. During these extended lifetimes aircraft normally change roles and have many different operating procedures. Standard design and maintenance safety regulations are frequently challenged by these changes and new methods of achieving the required levels of safety have to be worked out. All such changes have to be tracked throughout the remaining life of the fleet and new generations of maintenance personnel trained to understand their implications for the long-term battle against the inevitable consequences of metal fatigue, corrosion and the like. The resulting programmes require the reservation of funds and facilities for many years ahead. However, day-to-day problems and crisis arising from training and operations are urgent and never ending. Inevitably, there is a temptation to neglect the longer term with potential disastrous consequences.

From the formation of RAF Strike Command in the early Sixties the engineering branch of the RAF met these challenges by co-locating all the specialist engineering staff for each aircraft in a single office — the Role Office — and required each office to prepare an annual review of its long-term airworthiness plans. By the late 1990s these reviews were heard by the Chief Engineer himself so that he could satisfy the responsibility that all RAF aircraft were airworthy.

The XV230 report details that early this century the post of Chief Engineer was discontinued, that the chain of delegation now no longer passes through the hands of properly qualified and experienced engineers. Instead, it seems to follow the chain of command, which could and did include not just non-engineers but also personnel who had no experience of military aircraft operation. In addition, a whole management layer was removed and with it the capability to supervise the Role Offices — now expanded and retitled integrated project teams. This was a recipe for disaster. It was akin to giving a GP responsibility for the quality and extent of cancer care — or even giving the task to a non-medical person.

The report into XV230 rightly takes to task personnel who failed to meet the standards required of them, but it does not address the larger problem of allowing airworthiness responsibility to be held by untrained personnel. Nor does it sufficiently criticise the convoluted dissipation of airworthiness responsibility in the new tri-service logistic organisation so that the heavy weight of this task is not clearly laid on specific individuals. The public should demand the immediate restoration of airworthiness responsibility to those who are qualified and trained to handle it.

Air Vice-Marshal K. A. Campbell RAF (Ret’d)

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