THE LAND campaign got off to a successful start on May 21, 1982, when 3 Commando Brigade landed at San Carlos. A combination of surprise and a well chosen spot meant that the troops got ashore without any resistance. The process of getting their supplies ashore then proved to be arduous as the warships protecting the supply ships took a battering from waves of Argentine aircraft which were just within range.
For the Government the situation was alarming and frustrating. The bad news on ship losses (Ardent, Antelope, Coventry and Atlantic Conveyor) was not complemented by any news of break-outs from San Carlos and victories on land. The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, feared that international pressure, particularly from the US, could force the country into a ceasefire and compromise settlement with Britain, which was enjoying barely a toehold on the Falklands.
There was no settled plan for the land campaign. Up to this point this had been a maritime campaign and taken forward by a command chain of admirals. The main preoccupation had been with getting the troops to the Falklands safely. The land commander, Major General Jeremy Moore, had stayed with Admiral John Fieldhouse, the overall commander, at the Northwood headquarters until the last moment. He left as soon as he knew that the initial landing had been approved and joined the liner, Queen Elizabeth II, carrying 5 Infantry Brigade to boost troop numbers for the final effort to retake the islands. He might have expected to discuss the position with Brigadier Julian Thompson, in charge of 3 Commando Brigade, but because of communications problems for most of the journey he was unable to do so.
This left Thompson in a difficult position. His last orders from Moore were to move out from the bridgehead, but to wait for Moore, when he arrived with the extra brigade, to “develop operations for the complete repossession of the Falkland Islands”. There was little he could do anyway until all supplies were ashore and had been sorted. This all seemed too slow for London. The War Cabinet wanted movement and so did Northwood. They believed that there was nothing to stop Thompson moving out from the bridgehead and that Argentine morale was fragile and might soon break under pressure. Thompson had developed a plan for a bold move to take Mount Kent, high ground quite close to the key objective, Stanley. When, however, on May 25, he heard that three of his four Chinook heavy-lift helicopters had been lost with the Atlantic Conveyor he concluded that the whole pace of operations was bound to be slowed.
For London this loss had made the need for action more urgent than ever. When he had decided to focus on Mount Kent Thompson had aborted plans for a raid on the nearest Argentine garrison at the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green, the most substantial outside Stanley, with 25 and 127 inhabitants respectively. The original idea had been to mount a raid against the Goose Green garrison to destroy the small airfield, hurt the enemy and then return to the bridgehead. From London’s perspective this proposed raid, previously something of a sideshow, grew in possibilities as an opportunity to show the British people that the reoccupation of the Islands was making progress, the Argentine commanders that the British forces were irresistible, and the international community that there was no intention to pause to allow a ceasefire to be negotiated. Thompson saw Goose Green as a diversion from his main effort, but he was told directly and forcefully by Fieldhouse that that it must be taken to provide a vital early victory.
Thompson ordered 2 Parachute Battalion to “carry out a raid on Goose Green isthmus to capture the settlements before withdrawing in reserve for the main thrust in the north”. Yet capturing the settlements meant more than just a raid, and this was implied by an attack of the planned size and logistical complexity. The Commander, 2 Para, Colonel “H” Jones, was focused more on the “capture” aspects of the plan than the raid. Even though Thompson had not allocated extra resources, Jones’s ambition was reflected in his orders to his company commanders to capture Goose Green. Once that had been achieved he was uncertain as to whether 2 Para would stay there.
Facing him was the 643-strong Argentine 12 Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Italo Piaggi. It was reinforced by two groups of 100 and 140 extra troops flying in respectively from Stanley and Mount Kent (helpfully for the British) as the Argentine commanders realised that the garrison could be a target for British action. Also present were 150 Air Force personnel who could not contribute to the battle. So 2 Para was being asked to dislodge an Argentine force of comparable size to its own, which could be reinforced, from a long strip of eminently defensible ground.
While preparing for their assault on the afternoon of May 27, the Paratroops heard on the BBC World Service that they had just completed the move they were then preparing to make. Their feeling that they had been badly let down by the media was not helped by the sight of Argentine helicopter activity around the garrison they were about to attack. Few in the task force were aware of the frenzy of media speculation in Britain. Although official statements made no mention of Darwin and Goose Green, it did not take much strategic insight to work out that they represented a tempting target for the task force, and speculation that they were about to be taken (or indeed already had been taken) began on Monday, May 24, took hold by the Tuesday and was rife by Wednesday. The broadcast had little impact on Argentine plans, but 2 Para could not know that. There was real concern that any element of surprise had been lost.
Jones had good reason to be worried. He had embarked on his mission expecting to face a smaller enemy force than the one he now believed to be confronting him, and the effective position of 2 Para had just been broadcast, literally, to the whole world. He had brought only two 81mm mortars and a limited amount of ammunition for a quick action. The terrain was unfamiliar, it would have to be covered at night, so co-ordination was bound to be difficult, and at speed, to take advantage of the darkness while it lasted. Moreover, the detail of the Argentine deployments was sketchy.
In such unfavourable conditions, few would have quibbled if he had argued for the attack to be delayed, while reinforcements were brought forward from the bridgehead, or even cancelled altogether. Jones, fully imbued with his regiment's spirit, but conscious of the consequences of failure, hesitated. He then took the decision, steeled himself and his men to go forward, and issued orders.
Initially the paras moved forward without too much trouble. The battle was described in a signal back to Brigade headquarters as “a bit chaotic but going well”. Gradually they hit upon more resistance. Even after successful engagements with the enemy, the platoons took time to sort themselves out, do what they could for the dead and wounded, regroup and work out what to do next. The attack lost its rhythm and synchronisation. Piaggi was able to report back to Stanley that the British attack had been halted. If he had been able to move fresh units into the battle the outcome might have been different.
Frustrated and reluctant to command from behind, Jones decided to lead from the front and told A Company, led by Major Dair Farrar-Hockley, facing a strong Argentine position on Darwin Hill, to wait until he could join him to assess the position. By the time he arrived it was almost first light and time was working against his men. Farrar-Hockley’s inclination was to pour superior fire on to the enemy position. Jones wanted quicker results, both to make up for past delays and to reduce the risk of A Company being caught in an Argentine counter-attack. He proposed various forms of direct attacks, few of which seemed feasible because of the weight of enemy fire.
Eventually it was agreed that a small group of about 15 men led by the A Company Commander should make an assault. The Battalion Adjutant (Captain David Wood), who had been following Jones, decided to participate. They were repulsed by intense enemy machinegun fire, killing three, including Wood. At this point Jones decided to act. With some members of his Tactical HQ he moved into a small gully, from where he could see an enemy position close by. Armed with a sub-machinegun, he charged off towards the nearest enemy trench but was exposed to fire from other trenches. Having been shot once, he picked himself up and carried on firing, but close to his target he was hit again. He died before he could be evacuated.
