DURING the debate on the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill two weeks ago, the increasingly impressive Shadow Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, told the House of Commons that this country is “on a cusp in relation to the question of religious tolerance”. Last week, the House of Lords heard the case of the schoolgirl Shabina Begum, who complained that her school uniform was insufficiently modest to comply with her religious beliefs. The appeal raises fundamental questions about balancing the religious rights of the individual and the interests of the community.

We respect the right of everyone to believe whatever they like: that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, Muhammad was God’s prophet, the Red Sea was parted for the Children of Israel or L. Ron Hubbard identified the path to total happiness. But there are two important limits to religious tolerance.

First, I have no right to legal protection against your scepticism, criticism or ridicule. Religion is too powerful a force, and is too often a cause of injustice or evil, for it to be immune from discussion and debate. The Government failed to defend this principle when seeking to strengthen the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. The House of Commons rightly agreed with the House of Lords that freedom of expression must be protected. Muslims are, of course, entitled to feel offended by the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. They have the right to express their outrage in a peaceful manner. But in Europe it is not the role of the law, far less the Government, to prohibit or punish publications that sections of the community (whether Christians, Jews, Muslims or atheists) find offensive.

The second legitimate restriction on freedom of religion is that Parliament and the courts may prevent some manifestations of religious belief. The law prohibits harmful conduct (such as setting fire to an abortion clinic), however sincerely a person may believe that such acts are commanded by his or her god. Abraham would be very fortunate today to escape with a bindover for the binding, and attempted murder, of his son Isaac. “God told me to do it” is not recognised as a defence in St Albans Crown Court.

Much more difficult questions are raised by manifestations of religious belief that do not cause such obvious harm, but that may conflict with public policy or with other interests. Should turbaned Sikhs be immune from the rule that motorcyclists must wear a crash helmet? Must employers allow Jews, Muslims and others to have days off to celebrate their religious festivals?

Ms Begum attended Denbigh High School in Luton. Most pupils were Muslim. The school uniform included an option for girls to wear a shalwar kameez, involving a smock-like dress and loose trousers. They could also wear a headscarf. This uniform had been chosen after consultation with parents, pupils and religious authorities. It satisfied mainstream Muslim opinion. After attending the school for two years, Ms Begum decided, for religious reasons, that she wanted to wear a jilbab, which conceals the shape of a woman’s arms and legs. The school refused to change its policy. Ms Begum eventually left to attend another school which allowed her to wear a jilbab.

It would be surprising were the House of Lords to recognise that Ms Begum had a right to wear a jilbab at school. Last November, the European Court of Human Rights decided, by 16-1, that it was not a breach of the right to religious freedom for a female university student in Turkey to be refused admission to lectures if she insisted on wearing an Islamic headscarf. The court emphasised that, in a multicultural society, restrictions on the manifestation of religion might be necessary to protect the interests of others. The university authorities were entitled to require the removal of the headscarf in order to protect female students who did not wish to wear such an item and who would otherwise come under severe pressure from extremist groups to comply with religious requirements.

The evidence on behalf of the school expressed similar concerns. A secular school is entitled to refuse to allow its female pupils to wear the more conservative jilbab if there is a reasonable basis for concern that girls who would wish to follow a more liberal tradition would then be pressured to conform to an extreme religious conception of the female role that they want to avoid. Ms Begum’s religious rights have to be balanced against the rights and interests of other pupils, especially when the school adopts a dress code that is consistent with majority Muslim tradition.

Shabina Begum v Denbigh High School is not just a case about the rights of a schoolgirl to wear a jilbab. It is also a case about whether a secular school may protect other pupils from religious pressures that seek to dictate the role of women.

The author is a practising barrister at Blackstone Chambers and a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford

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