He comes to the point. He will be out of the country from January 2 to 8 and so will John Prescott. Would I take over the shop and be the duty cabinet minister for the period? What is interesting is not that I've been asked but those who have not been asked. The logical person to ask would be Gordon Brown, and it is a weakness of this government that the prime minister would not dream of inviting his chancellor to stand in and wonder what policy announcement may be made in his absence.

Friday January 11, 2002: John Duncan, my constituency assistant, produces an oleaginous letter from The Mail on Sunday You Magazine. For more than two years they have been sending such letters to Gaynor begging for an interview. Gaynor has stuck to a firm rule ever since the first dark days that she does not speak to the press. At first I thought she was mistaken, but now I regard it as immense wisdom on her part. She has preserved her dignity and her privacy throughout all these turbulent years.

Wednesday February 27: I scrambled to catch the Eurostar to a meeting of the Party of European Socialists praesidium and steamed into growing storm clouds for Britain over the Channel. There is particular concern tonight about the possibility that George Bush will take military action against Iraq.

Thursday February 28: I walk over Green Park to the cabinet, troubled by my discussion in Brussels. Before I can raise it, David Blunkett asks if we can have a discussion at an early meeting on Iraq.

I back him up by explaining that military action against Iraq will not be supported in Europe. Nor throughout the Arab world: "In present circumstances Arab governments would not comprehend such obsession with Iraq. They see Sharon, not Saddam, as the problem for the Middle East." Somewhat to my surprise this line provokes a round of "hear hearing" from colleagues, which is the nearest I've heard to a mutiny in the cabinet.

Thursday March 7: A real discussion at cabinet. Tony permitted us to have the debate on Iraq which David and I had asked for. For the first time I can recall in five years, Tony was out on a limb.

David was first over the top. Being now home secretary he cunningly camped on the need for a proper legal authority for any action: "What has changed that suddenly gives us the legal right to take military action that we didn't have a few months ago? Has anybody asked the legal opinion of the attorney-general, and what is he saying?"

Pat Hewitt lamented that we were expected to listen to US worries about Iraq when we could not get them to listen to us before slapping higher tariffs on our steel exports. "We are in danger of being seen as close to President Bush, but without any influence over President Bush."

I am told that in the old days prime ministers would sum up the balance of view in the discussion. This would be simple in the present case as all contributions pointed in one direction. However, Tony does not regard the cabinet as a place for decisions. Normally he avoids having discussions in cabinet until decisions are taken and announced to it.

Tony appeared totally unfazed at the fact that on this occasion the balance of discussion pointed strongly in the reverse direction of his intentions. Rather than attempt to sum up the discussion of this supreme body of collective government, he responded as if he was replying to a question-and-answer session from a party branch.

He was patient with us, but he was firm where he saw Britain's national interests lie: "I tell you that we must steer close to America. If we don't we will lose our influence to shape what they do."

This was the last cabinet meeting at which a large number of ministers spoke up against the war. I have little sympathy with the criticism of Tony that he sidelined the cabinet over Iraq. On the contrary, over the next six months we were to discuss Iraq more than any other topic, but only Clare Short and I ever expressed frank doubts about the trajectory in which we were being driven.